

**Committee for Coordination of  
Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand  
(CCSDPT)**

***PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE***

**THE IMPACT OF RESETTLEMENT  
ON THE REMAINING CAMP POPULATION**

**JULY 2007**


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## MAP OF THAI-BURMESE BORDER CAMPS

Burmese border refugee sites with population figures: April 2007



SOURCE: THAILAND BURMA BORDER CONSORTIUM (2007)

## ACRONYMS

|        |   |
|--------|---|
| ADRA   | Adventist Development and Relief Agency                                 |
| AMI    | Aide Médicale Internationale  |
| ARC    | American Refugee Committee  |
| ATVs   | Affected Thai Villages  |
| CBO    | Community Based Organisation  |
| CC     | Camp Committee  |
| CCSDPT | Committee for Coordination of Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand |
| CHE    | Community Health Education / Community Health Educator                  |
| CHW    | Community Health Worker   |
| COERR  | Catholic Office for Emergency Relief and Refugees                       |
| CSW    | Community Social Worker   |
| DARE   | Drug Awareness Rehabilitation Education                                 |
| EC     | Executive Committee   |
| EVI    | Extremely Vulnerable Individual   |
| HI     | Handicap International  |
| IOM    | International Organisation for Migration                                |
| IPD    | Inpatient Department  |
| IRC    | International Rescue Committee  |
| JRS    | Jesuit Refugee Service  |
| KED    | Karen Education Department  |
| KEWU   | Karen Education Worker's Union  |
| KHWA   | Karen Health and Welfare Association                                    |
| KnDD   | Karenni Development Department  |
| KnED   | Karenni Education Department  |
| KnHD   | Karenni Health Department   |
| KnRC   | Karenni Refugee Committee   |
| KnTTC  | Karenni Teacher Training Centre   |
| KRC    | Karen Refugee Committee   |
| KSNG   | Karen Students' Network Group   |
| KWO    | Karen Women's Organisation  |
| KYWLS  | Karen Young Women's Leadership School                                   |
| MOE    | Ministry of Education   |
| MOI    | Ministry of Interior  |
| NFE    | Non-formal education  |
| NGO    | Non-Government Organisation   |
| OPD    | Outpatient Department   |
| OPE    | Overseas Processing Entity  |
| PAB    | Provisional Admission Board   |
| PPAT   | Planned Parenthood Association of Thailand                              |
| RCH    | Reproductive and Child Health   |
| RTG    | Royal Thai Government   |
| RTP    | Right to Play   |
| RTT    | Resident Teacher Trainers   |
| SGBV   | Sexual and Gender-based Violence  |
| SMRU   | Shoklo Malaria Research Unit  |
| SVA    | Shanti Volunteer Association  |
| TBBC   | Thailand Burma Border Consortium  |
| TPC    | Teacher Preparation Course  |
| UNHCR  | United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees                           |
| VCT    | Voluntary Counselling and Testing                                       |
| VT     | Vocational Training   |
| WE/C   | World Education/Consortium  |
| ZOA    | ZOA Refugee Care The Netherlands  |

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In Bangkok, we were grateful to meet with representatives of resettlement countries, IOM, UNHCR, and the Ministry of the Interior. We are particularly grateful for the assistance of the UNHCR Bangkok office, whose staff received numerous urgent requests for data and always answered them immediately.

Special thanks go to Jack Dunford, Sally Thompson, and the entire TBBC staff, all of whose patience and humour made the work for this report a pleasure.

Much of the credit for this report lies with our numerous respondents, while all errors are our own.

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Introduction

For more than 20 years, refugees from Burma have been fleeing to Thailand to seek refuge from the practices of human rights abuse, forced labour, arbitrary arrest and detention, torture, and extrajudicial killing, carried out by the authoritarian regime in Burma. Of the hundreds of thousands of Burmese who currently reside in Thailand, some 150,000 live in refugee camps, where opportunities for durable solutions to their protracted displacement have, until recently, been scarce. Since 2005, however, efforts to resettle considerable numbers of Burmese refugees to third countries have been underway.

As the resettlement program gathers momentum and people prepare to depart for a new life in third countries, there is a clear need to understand the impact on camp management and services. For many people, resettlement offers renewed hope, opportunities, and a permanent solution away from prolonged encampment. However, the departure of skilled, educated, and experienced camp staff and community leaders from camp programs and services has generated concerns about how best to mitigate the negative impacts on service delivery to the remaining camp population.

### Methodology

The goal of this study, contained in the CCSDPT Terms of Reference, was to carry out a review of the impact of the resettlement of Burmese refugees residing in camps along the Thai-Burmese border on camp management and services. The tasks were to assess the actual and anticipated impacts of resettlement on the remaining population, to study interventions already being undertaken or under consideration, and to make recommendations for a strategic response.

There were quantitative and qualitative dimensions to the research. Quantitatively, statistical data were gathered on the number of educated/skilled/experienced people in each camp, the numbers required to run camp programs and services, and the numbers of those who have already begun the resettlement process. Analysis of this data allowed for estimated projections of future educated/non-educated populations in 2007 and 2008. The impact of resettlement was also investigated qualitatively, in order to understand more precisely the realities of program and service delivery. During the course of all interviews, the researchers emphasised the neutrality of the study with regards to the resettlement issue, allowing respondents to identify their own assessments and priorities.

### Current Context of Resettlement

Resounding themes throughout the course of the consultation illustrate the context within which resettlement is occurring in Thailand. First, it is the overall situation in which refugees find themselves today that contributes to their decisions to seek resettlement, or even consider it, as an option. The continuing conflict in Burma has led to prolonged encampment in Thailand — for long-term camp residents, for over 20 years. At present, camp residents are restricted in their movements. In general, these are the factors that are encouraging refugees to resettle, rather than a deep-seated desire to move permanently to a third country. Second, and related, uncertainty about the future informs every aspect of refugees' decisions about resettlement, from deciding whether or not they should apply at all, to considering when they should apply (immediately or in a few years time), with which family members they should apply, and to which resettlement country they should apply.

### Impact of Resettlement: Overall Observations

From 2005 to early May 2007, no more than 5,500 Burmese refugees from all nine camps departed for resettlement to third countries. Despite this small number, which represents 4.2% of the registered camp population, the impact of resettlement is evident, even in those camps where the resettlement process is in very early stages. In nearly every camp, the educated members of the population have been interested in, been submitted for, been accepted, and have departed

for resettlement in disproportionately higher percentages than the rest of the population. Averaged across nine camps, only 2.4% of those with no education have departed for resettlement, while 11.5% of those with a post-10 education have departed. Related, those working for NGOs have departed, and applied for resettlement, in higher proportions than the rest of the population. And while the education level of the resettling population can be quantified with relative ease, and the number of NGO workers can be estimated to some extent, it is also the case that individuals with experience, authority, and leadership qualities are also applying for resettlement in higher proportions than the rest of the population.

### **Factors Influencing the Depletion of Skilled Workers**

There are three primary reasons that explain the depletion of skilled and educated residents from the camps. First, the educated want to resettle in higher percentages than the total camp population. It is therefore not surprising that, averaged across all nine camps, 38% of the entire population has expressed an interest in resettlement, while 61% of the post-10 population has. Second, UNHCR's resettlement criteria follow a 'first-in, first-out' procedure, wherein refugees who arrived in Thailand first are among the first to be submitted by UNHCR to resettlement countries. In camps where the educated have been in the camps the longest, they will have the opportunity to resettle first. Third, some resettlement countries emphasise the importance of integration potential in selecting candidates for resettlement.

### **Limited labour pool and the difficulty of replacement**

As the skilled and educated leave, it is increasingly difficult to find replacements within the existing population. Since refugee camps are not an open labour market, there is a limited supply of skilled workers for the jobs necessary in the camp population. In some camps, virtually every post-10 graduate is already employed.

Research conducted for this report shows that of a total camp employee population of just over 7,000, approximately 911 require a post-10 education in order to maintain the current level of services in the camps. A projection of the departures of the post-10 educated population reveals that within six months, the post-10 population will have decreased by 38% across all camps, while the total population of the camps will only have decreased by 10%. In addition, although a decrease in the total population of the camp will mean that some camp-based positions will not be necessary, the need will not decrease exactly commensurate with the total population, thus heightening the problem of fewer skilled workers. Within 18 months (by the end of 2008), the number of post-10 camp residents will be at a critically low level; unless responses are crafted and implemented immediately, there will not be sufficient numbers of appropriately educated camp residents to carry out necessary camp functions.

Stakeholders throughout the camps, across the sectors, reported the importance not only of educational qualifications (which are easily quantified) but also the value of long-term experience, authority, and status (which are not).

Further, while NGOs have already begun to respond to the loss of workers by developing short-term trainings, these do not easily replace institutional memory and tacit knowledge built up through a capacity-building approach over many years. While NGOs are already faced with the task of replacing experienced and educated workers, many report the further challenge of retaining replacement staff. This is because NGOs are starting to witness (immediate or anticipated) the resettlement of 'second-liners' or those who have been trained as replacements.

### **Mood in the camps in the context of resettlement**

The mood in the camps in the context of resettlement is mixed. For a population that has been in prolonged limbo, resettlement represents the promise of a better future with opportunities for a new life, particularly in the absence of other durable solutions. However, it also represents the threat of losing the dream of return home, and the fear of the unknown. Interviews with camp residents demonstrated the contrasting emotions of a sense of hope and expectation for those resettling, depression and anger for those rejected, anxiety for those who are still waiting to hear the final decision, and confusion for those who have not yet decided what they want to do.

## **Education**

The education sector in the camps has been hard hit by resettlement. Finding teachers of quality has always been difficult, even prior to the advent of resettlement, and will continue to be so. Of greater concern, however, is the loss of supervisors, school principals, subject coordinators, teacher trainers, and other long-serving education staff. Many of these individuals have been trained over time in education tools such as curriculum development, classroom management, and school supervision. The loss of personnel who can provide educational guidance heightens the problem of losing long-serving teachers, influencing the quality of teaching, monitoring, and training.

The education sector is also affected by resettlement because of two particular issues: first, because teachers receive lower remuneration than other NGO workers, losses in other sectors will compound the losses in the education sector, as teachers move into other jobs. Second, the capacity building approach adopted by education NGOs and CBOs was designed with repatriation in mind, specifically to empower refugees to conduct their own trainings, monitoring, and reporting. This very approach now makes the education system more vulnerable to decline.

A decrease in the quality and availability of teaching staff will impact the education sector negatively, and over time, a decline in camp education will have reverberating effects on the rest of the camp population in terms of service delivery, as fewer individuals have sufficient education to work in high-level camp-based jobs.

The loss of English teacher trainers and English teachers is likely to continue. This sets the stage for fewer English language courses and an increasingly limited pool of English language speakers in the camps, which will result in NGOs relying on non-camp interpreters, increasing financial and administrative costs.

It is anticipated that the decreasing availability/quality of supervisors and school principals will also result in a decreased ability to observe and monitor teachers; a decline in control and discipline at the school level; the closing/reorganizing of schools, possibly in the middle of the school year; and fewer staff capable of writing and submitting donor reports and proposals, thus decreasing the likelihood of securing and maintaining outside funding options.

## **Health**

As with the education sector, the impact of resettlement on the health sector is already being strongly felt quantitatively and qualitatively. The number of camp-based health staff resettling is disproportionately high, with some programs losing 50% or more of their staff in 2007. Qualitatively, the health sector is experiencing the departure of some of its most experienced managerial and specialised staff members, who are particularly difficult to replace in the short and intermediate period. Further, in the context of the health sector (where training takes time and high levels of skill are required), the timing of resettlement is having impacts on the ability of the sector to find and train replacements, especially at more senior levels.

The role of skilled interpreters is particularly important in the health sector. Advanced levels of technical proficiency and skill are developed over long periods and these positions are not easily or quickly replaced. Interpreters in the health sector require specialised technical proficiency. Finding suitably qualified staff was a challenge even before resettlement. A preliminary assessment of the number of camp-based workers needed to have English proficiency reveals that the health sector requires the most: of approximately 250 camp-based technical English speakers needed to run the camps, 184 (75%) are in the health sector.

The actual and anticipated consequences of fewer and less qualified medical staff include: a general decline in the overall quality of health care, the risk of misdiagnosis, a reported loss of confidence by patients in medical services, the trend toward patients presenting when conditions become more severe, an increase in the number of hospital referrals, increasing under-nutrition, communicable disease outbreak, and potential problems in program coverage of preventative

health (including immunisation, supplementary feeding, and growth monitoring). In addition, fewer and less experienced staff will compound stresses on training and programmatic capacity.

### **Camp Administration**

As in the case of the education and health sectors, camp administration is built on the development of local capacity. The camp committees and community-based organisations (CBOs) are occupied with understanding and finding ways to mitigate the more challenging and negative impacts of resettlement on the camp community and are particularly outspoken about the timing and impact of resettlement on camp programs and the community more broadly.

Consultations with camp committees found that the impact of resettlement on their own numbers of staff has thus far been manageable given the way in which their structures operate, allowing for the relatively smooth succession of staff into these roles, although gaps in key personnel result in extra workload falling on remaining committee members. Overall, comparatively small numbers of their staff have departed or applied for resettlement, although in some camps more members have left or applied for resettlement.

Among other wider considerations anticipated to influence the work of CBOs is the phenomenon that as the overall pool of skilled, educated, and experienced people in the camp decreases, NGOs search for the best available staff. In this situation, it is anticipated that NGOs will inevitably compete for the available qualified camp-based people serving in CBOs. Also, as the overall pool of skilled workers available is reduced, people recruited to work full-time in NGOs will have less time to dedicate to working with CBOs, which generally do not pay stipends.

Resettlement also has the potential to detract from the financial and temporal resources of the community. First, discussions with several CBO leaders revealed that educated and experienced members of CBOs have, in the past, been instrumental in writing funding proposals to donors in order to secure seed funding for small projects in the camps. When individuals with these skills depart, it may drain the resources of CBOs still further. Second, in some camps, camp committee members noted that they were expected to contribute their time and energy to aiding the resettlement process.

### **Other Resettlement-affected Groups**

In addition to having impacts in the health, education, and camp administration sectors of the camps, the issue of resettlement also arises for specific groups of camp individuals. In particular, extremely vulnerable individuals (EVIs) and separated children may be affected. On the one hand, EVIs may be less likely to resettle without extra assistance from UNHCR, NGOs, and CBOs. For the same reasons that the skilled and educated are among the first to apply, EVIs in general have the least access to information about resettlement and it is burdensome for them to apply. Related to the EVI resettlement issue are protection cases, those individuals and/or families whose need for protection makes them candidates for immediate resettlement. Separated children are at potential risk for vulnerability during the resettlement process because they rarely are permitted to resettle without the permission of their mother and father.

### **Positive Impacts**

At this early stage, few specific positive impacts were reported for the remaining population. There are two exceptions. First, remittances have already begun to flow to families and CBOs remaining in the camps. Second, when long-serving individuals vacate key positions, it can, in some instances, offer the opportunity for new leaders to emerge.

### **Financial Costs of Resettlement**

If resettlement leads to a decrease in the camp population, then it might be assumed that the overall costs for running the camps will decrease as well. In the long term, if camp populations do decrease, overall costs may be reduced, as the total need for food rations, camp worker subsidies, and household supplies decreases. In the short and intermediate term, however, the financial costs for running the nine camps on the border will increase as NGOs and CBOs continue to strive to provide quality services to camp residents.

## Recommendations to Key Stakeholders

This report concludes with recommendations to key stakeholders. These recommendations attempt to balance the more concerning aspects of the impact of resettlement — given the expeditious depletion of skilled and experienced staff from education and health sectors in particular — with constructive and positive recommendations and strategies. They reflect suggestions and strategies identified by a large range of stakeholders throughout the consultation to mitigate the negative impacts of resettlement on camp services to the remaining camp population.

### NGOs and CBOs

1. Continue trainings and shadowing for new replacements in camp-based programs.
  - In addition to stop-gap measures necessary to maintain the functioning of programs, boost long-term capacity within the sectors of education, health, and camp administration.
  - In order to frontload experience, pursue ‘shadowing’ with a pool of available individuals.
  - Continue to work with RTG to pursue greater work and travel flexibility for NGO workers. (See RTG recommendations).
2. Prioritise resources (both financial and labour) in key parts of education and health sectors to address resettlement’s impact:
  - Where financial resources are limited, devote significant funding to training replacement workers in the health and education sectors. In particular, focus on ensuring that the following programs are not neglected:
    - Post-10 education
    - Teacher preparation courses
    - Medic trainings
    - RCH trainings
  - Where possible, devote resources intended for resettling refugees to be available to the remaining population as well.
    - For example, promote VT and English programs that are relevant for the remaining population.
  - Be aware of differential stipends among camp positions, and of the possibility that camp-based workers may leave positions where they are needed in order to obtain a higher stipend.
3. As one way of addressing the loss of camp-based institutional knowledge, encourage longer-term contracts for expatriate and national staff to ensure continuity in the system.
4. Pursue initiatives and programs that would allow NGOs and CBOs to draw on the resources of the resettled population:
  - Where needed and possible, utilise members of resettled population as translators (for curriculum translation, for example)
  - Develop a database of resettled refugees with specific skills and/or strong connections to the camp in order to ensure best use of the experienced and skilled resettled population, particularly in light of the fact that many want to remain involved.
  - As an intermediate/long-term option, encourage the possibility of a return system in which resettled refugees can return to work in the camp community (see Resettlement Country recommendations).
5. Continue to advocate for a more predictable resettlement process. (See UNHCR recommendations).

6. To respond to the need for open communication with camp-based workers, encourage individual staff to 1) make decisions about resettlement based on their best interests; and 2) advise their employers of where they are in the resettlement process (applied/been submitted/been accepted/had medical check, etc.).
7. Identify EVIs who are truly interested in resettlement, and for whom it would be a good option, and work with UNHCR to assist them in the resettlement process.
8. In order to respond to the widespread interest in the findings of this report, consider distributing an edited summary of the report to interested stakeholders such as RTG officials and *palats*.
9. Strengthen responses to current leakage of skilled staff, including incentives for remaining staff in NGOs and CBOs. For example:
  - To boost morale of camp-based workers, develop and implement simple strategies to support staff, such as additional supplies, clothing with logos, free lunches, private social space, etc.
  - Write letters of recommendation for staff, both for those who are remaining and those who are departing. For departing staff members, this may encourage them to continue working with enthusiasm while they remain. For those remaining, letters of recommendation may help them to feel valuable and appreciated.

### **UNHCR, IOM, OPE**

#### *UNHCR*

1. In coordination with resettlement countries, provide as much information as possible on the timing of the resettlement process.
  - Distribute a basic information sheet that describes the approximate duration of each stage of the resettlement process.
  - Inasmuch as is possible, inform refugees where they are in the resettlement process so that they may inform their employers accordingly.
  - Develop a systematic process of consultation with NGOs and CBOs on the resettlement process specifically, to update agencies on when individuals will depart. This could take the form of:
    - Monthly meetings, perhaps added to the Monthly Coordination Meeting;
    - Written updates, translated into the appropriate languages.
2. Provide more information on the conditions in resettlement countries. CCs and CBOs expressed a view that camp residents applying for resettlement need more information before they apply so as to make more fully informed decisions. In coordination with resettlement countries, provide more balanced and accurate information about resettlement countries (social security provisions, climate, politics, social environment, challenges for new refugees settling, etc.) so that applicants have as much information as possible to inform their decisions to resettle.
3. Continue to carefully monitor the impact of resettlement missions on the functioning of camp services and camp activities, and take into consideration the feedback of CBOs and NGOs in this regard.
4. Ensure that the CCSDPT/UNHCR Comprehensive Plan includes specific proposals to address the impact of resettlement of skilled and educated staff needed to run the camps.

#### *IOM*

1. Given that training and handover time is often critical to support the induction of replacements, reconsider the advisability of building a reception centre (still in the

- planning stages) that would remove resettling refugees from the camp three months prior to their departure.
2. Continue to allow physical spaces devoted to resettlement to be used for the remaining population (when not being used for resettlement purposes).

#### *UNHCR, IOM, OPE*

1. Continue to be aware that human resources are the most limited of all, and draw from the camp labour supply with an awareness of how much it may affect different sectors.

#### **Resettlement Countries**

1. Respond to the need for more information and a more predictable departure system.
  - Coordinate with one another and consult with NGOs and CBOs about the timing of the resettlement process. There is a preference in the camp community (NGOs, CBOs, and camp committees) to time the resettlement process such that it minimises disruptions to NGO programs.
  - Because all parties rely on resettlement countries for much of the information about the timing of the resettlement process, improve communication with UNHCR, NGOs, CBOs, and CCs about the timing of: resettlement missions; the application and acceptance process; and resettlement departures.
2. Consider a system whereby resettled refugees could return to work in the camps (as expatriate workers) in a relatively short time period.

#### **Royal Thai Government**


1. Expedite the permission of NGO and CBO workers to work in and travel between the camps.
  - Provide permission to NGOs and CBOs to relocate skilled refugee workers between camps, where program shortages could be filled by receiving available qualified workers from other camps.
  - Continue to provide permission for refugees to attend centralised (short- and long-term) trainings in towns and other camps.
  - Where necessary, permit expatriate and national staff to provide more direct service delivery in the camps.
  - Minimise the administrative burden for obtaining work and travel permits.
2. Continue to move forward expeditiously with formal legal approval for education and livelihood programs outside camps, to expand opportunities for the remaining population.
  - Permit camp residents to work legally outside the camps.
  - Continue to improve access to the Thai education system for camp students.

#### **Donors**

1. Contribute to improving resources for the remaining population by supporting initiatives that address the impact of resettlement and maintain existing services in the camps.
2. With the recognition that, especially in the short term, resettlement will cost more for the remaining population (rather than less), support training and capacity building programs and initiatives for inexperienced and new staff in the camps.
3. Recognise that new funding initiatives can affect the remaining population. Even if the financial resources come from a separate funding stream that is earmarked for one

program, the limited pool of labour in the camps means that new programs can take staff away from existing programs.

**All Stakeholders**

1. Continue to advocate for other local durable solutions, in particular to work toward positive developments that strengthen refugee self-reliance by improving the ability of refugees to pursue education and livelihood opportunities both within and outside the camps.
  2. Given the source of refugee movement into Thailand, continue to work with the international community to advocate for change in Burma and address the underlying root causes of protracted conflict there.
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## 1. INTRODUCTION

For more than 20 years, refugees from Burma have been fleeing to Thailand to seek refuge from the practices of human rights abuse, forced labour, arbitrary arrest and detention, torture, and extrajudicial killing, carried out by the authoritarian regime in Burma.<sup>1</sup> Of the hundreds of thousands of Burmese who currently reside in Thailand, some 150,000 live in refugee camps, where opportunities for durable solutions to their protracted displacement have, until recently, been scarce. Since 2005, however, efforts to resettle considerable numbers of Burmese refugees to third countries have been underway.

As the resettlement program gathers momentum and people prepare to depart for a new life in third countries, there is a clear need to understand the impact on camp management and services. For many people, resettlement offers renewed hope, opportunities, and a permanent solution away from prolonged encampment.<sup>2</sup> However, the departure of skilled, educated, and experienced camp staff and community leaders from camp programs and services has generated concerns about how best to mitigate the negative impacts on service delivery to the remaining camp population.

During 2006, the Committee for Coordination of Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand (CCSDPT) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) held two workshops (also inviting resettlement countries) to review the resettlement process and its impact on camp management and services. The CCSDPT also undertook two resettlement questionnaires (January and November 2006), which generated considerable preliminary data pointing to a range of concerns, particularly around the departure of skilled and experienced staff from camp NGO and CBO programs and services. Resettlement workshops, discussion, and the results of these surveys pointed to the need for a comprehensive review of resettlement and its impact on the services to the remaining population.

Stakeholders and respondents widely welcomed the CCSDPT's commissioning of this study. Many NGOs, CBOs, and camp committees shared concerns about the impact of resettlement on camp communities, and are undertaking a number of measures to mitigate the negative consequences. This report documents the reported impacts, concerns, and current and future suggested strategies and actions to address these impacts.

The report begins with a brief note on methodology and an overview of the current context of resettlement. This is followed by an examination of the impact of resettlement, focusing on the sectors of education, health, and camp administration. The report also documents findings on other resettlement-affected groups, notes the positive aspects of resettlement, and provides some observations about the financial cost of resettlement. The report concludes with a comprehensive set of recommendations to key stakeholders based on the overall findings of the report. Analysis in the appendices uses quantitative

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<sup>1</sup> The abuses of the Burmese government are well documented. See, for example, Amnesty International, 'Myanmar's Political Prisoners: A Growing Legacy of Injustice' (New York: Amnesty International, 2005) or Human Rights Documentation Unit, 'Human Rights Yearbook Burma' (Mae Sot: HRDU, 2006).

<sup>2</sup> The UNHCR discusses the role of resettlement as an instrument of protection through three functions – as a tool of international protection for individual refugees, as a durable solution alongside other solutions as part of a comprehensive strategy to overcome protracted refugee situations, and as an expression of international 'burden sharing'. UNHCR, *The State of the World's Refugees: Human Displacement in the New Millennium* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 142-43.

data to support some of the findings in the report, offering both general and camp-specific observations.

## 2. METHODOLOGY

The goal of this study, contained in the CCSDPT Terms of Reference, was to carry out a review of the impact of the resettlement of Burmese refugees residing in camps along the Thai-Burmese border on camp management and services. The tasks were to assess the actual and anticipated impacts of resettlement on the remaining population, to study interventions already being undertaken or under consideration, and to make recommendations for a strategic response.

There were quantitative and qualitative dimensions to the research. Quantitatively, statistical data were gathered on the number of educated/skilled/experienced people in each camp, the numbers required to run camp programs and services, and the numbers of those who have already begun the resettlement process. Analysis of this data allowed for preliminary estimated projections of future educated/non-educated populations in 2007 and 2008. The impact of resettlement was also investigated qualitatively, in order to understand more precisely the realities of program and service delivery. During the course of all interviews, the researchers emphasised the neutrality of the study with regards to the resettlement issue, allowing respondents to identify their own assessments and priorities.

The scope of consultations in this participatory study included all major stakeholders involved in the management and delivery of services to the camps. The researchers consulted and interviewed a comprehensive and diverse range of stakeholders in all nine refugee camps, town-based NGOs and CBOs along the border, Bangkok-based offices of CCSDPT NGOs, and Thai Ministry of Interior (MOI), UNHCR, International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and resettlement country representatives in Bangkok. Staff members from every CCSDPT NGO were interviewed, as well as staff from other non-CCSDPT NGOs working in the camps such as the Planned Parenthood Association of Thailand (PPAT) and Shoklo Malaria Research Unit (SMRU). Mae Tao clinic in Mae Sot was also included. (Refer to List of Stakeholders Interviewed, Appendix F).

Stakeholders interviewed in the camps included Camp Committees (CCs) in all nine camps, including members of the Executive Committees (ECs), coordinators from health, education, social welfare, security and justice subcommittees, as well as section leaders, zone leaders (in camps where zones function), and individuals from special sections, such as the leaders of Muslim, Buddhist, and Christian communities, Persons of Concern/slipholders, unregistered/PAB-pending representatives, and other specialised groups, such as children living in boarding houses and Extremely Vulnerable Individuals (EVIs). The researchers also met with supervisors and various staff in camp-based NGO programs, particularly focused on (but not limited to) the education and health sectors. A diverse sample of CBOs was interviewed to understand the impact of resettlement on their work, either directly or indirectly. (Refer to List of Stakeholders Interviewed in Appendix F).

The task of the study required in-depth consultations with a wide sample of NGOs, CBOs and camp committee members, but the disparate location of the camps along the

border and the available time to undertake the study (8 weeks) permitted only a maximum of two full days of consultations inside each of the nine camps. In addition to in-camp visits, consultations were undertaken with staff members from each CCSDPT NGO in each of the main border towns – Mae Hong Son, Mae Sariang, Mae Sot, Umphang, and Sangklaburi. Camp coordinating bodies – Karen Refugee Committee (KRC) and the Karenni Refugee Committee (KnRC) – were also interviewed. In some areas, detailed interviews were conducted with Thai camp commanders (*palats*).

### 3. CURRENT CONTEXT OF RESETTLEMENT

While the emphasis of this report is on the current and future experiences of the remaining population who will not (or have not yet) resettled, it is important to note the reasons for which individuals and families are considering resettlement as an option. These reasons – resounding themes throughout the course of the consultation – bear mention because they illustrate the context within which resettlement is occurring in Thailand.

First, it is the overall situation in which refugees find themselves today that contributes to their decisions to seek resettlement, or even consider it, as an option. The continuing conflict in Burma means that refugees are unable to return to their homes, attachments to family, friends, home villages, and land notwithstanding. Prolonged encampment in Thailand – for long-term camp residents, for over 20 years – has reinforced a sense of hopelessness about future possibilities. At present, camp residents are restricted in their movements and few are permitted to leave the camps to pursue livelihoods or to obtain a higher education. In general, these are the factors that are encouraging refugees to resettle, rather than a deep-seated desire to move permanently to a third country. One stakeholder noted that the process has moved slowly partially because refugees' preference is generally to return to their home country. He noted that for Burmese refugees, resettlement represents a real break from the longstanding dream of returning; that they do not want to give up the struggle, and that they have sensible questions about what life will be like once they move. While refugees' preference is generally to return to their home country, the stakeholder also noted that some of the refugees seem to genuinely welcome the resettlement opportunity when it is presented to them.<sup>3</sup>

Second, and related, uncertainty about the future informs every aspect of refugees' decisions about resettlement, from deciding whether or not they should apply at all, to considering when they should apply (immediately or in a few years time), with which family members they should apply, and to which resettlement country they should apply.<sup>4</sup> The lack of information for refugees is ubiquitous and manifests itself in questions such as:

- How long will resettlement be an option (i.e., can I apply in future)?
- Can I send for my family in a few years?
- Will I/my children have opportunities for work and education in a new country?

<sup>3</sup> Confidential interview with stakeholder, Bangkok. March 2007.

<sup>4</sup> Technically, refugees do not have a choice to which country they are resettled, but in practice there is room for choice for some refugees.

- Will the Royal Thai government (RTG) become more flexible or more strict in regards to camp policy in the future? Will local integration be an option?
- Will the camps close in the future? Will food rations and supplies continue?
- Will we be forced back to Burma if we do not resettle?
- Will conditions improve in Burma over time? Will I be able to return to my homeland?

It is clear that some of these questions are answerable, by resettlement countries and UNHCR. But what is also clear is that some of the uncertainty is inherent to the situation of refugees everywhere – that their current and future situations cannot be guaranteed. This, as much as anything else, demonstrates the complexities of refugees' decisions to pursue resettlement or not.

#### 4. IMPACT OF RESETTLEMENT: OVERALL OBSERVATIONS<sup>5</sup>

From 2005 to early May 2007, no more than 5,500 Burmese refugees from all nine camps departed for resettlement to third countries. Despite this small number, which represents 4.2% of the registered camp population, the impact of resettlement is evident, even in those camps where the resettlement process is in very early stages.<sup>6</sup>

In nearly every camp, the educated members of the population have been interested in, been submitted for, been accepted, and have departed for resettlement in disproportionately higher percentages than the rest of the population.<sup>7</sup> For example, averaged across nine camps, only 2.4% of those with no education have departed for resettlement, while 11.5% of those with a post-10 education have departed. Detailed information about resettlement activity compared to education level is explained in Appendix A.

Related to education levels, those working for NGOs have departed, and are applying for resettlement, in higher proportions than the rest of the population. For example, in Tham Hin, approximately one-third of the total camp population has departed for resettlement, while more than one-half of all NGO workers have departed.<sup>8</sup> Stable figures supporting this finding across all camps are difficult to collect, not least because 1) the numbers applying for resettlement change daily; and 2) camp employees continue to shift their jobs in order to respond to the demands on camp services due to resettlement.

<sup>5</sup> Unless otherwise noted, the quantitative data in this section is based on UNHCR resettlement data, May 2007. We are indebted to Jeffrey Savage and Chulapat Jirayut of UNHCR for providing these at short notice.

<sup>6</sup> The registered camp population is just over 132,000 residents, according to UNHCR. According to TBBC data, however, which includes new arrivals, births, and deaths since MOI/UNHCR registration, the camp population in all nine camps is nearly 154,000 (May 2007). This means the percentage of the total who have departed for resettlement is, in actuality, lower: approximately 3.6% of the entire camp population. Unless otherwise specified, the quantitative data in this report refers to the registered camp population only, for two reasons. First, there is limited data availability about the education levels of unregistered camp residents. Second, unregistered camp residents are not permitted to resettle.

<sup>7</sup> Because there are far fewer educated than uneducated in the camps, it is not the case that the total number of educated seeking/departing for resettlement is higher than the number of uneducated. But it is the case that a higher proportion of the educated, as a fraction of the educated population, is seeking/departing for resettlement than the proportion of the uneducated.

<sup>8</sup> Based on UNHCR May 2007 estimates of number departed, and authors' estimates of the camp-based NGO worker population.

Furthermore, while the education level of the resettling population can be quantified with relative ease, and the number of NGO workers can be estimated to some extent, it is also the case that individuals with experience, authority, and leadership qualities are also applying for resettlement in higher proportions than the rest of the population. This information was collected anecdotally, and was evident in all camps, including both those camps with lower rates of total resettlement and those with a group referral process and higher rates of resettlement.

In addition, departure rates do not show the full quantitative impact of resettlement for three reasons. First, according to NGO stakeholders, some of the most significant departures from the camps are those individuals who wear many hats. For example, a headmistress of a school might also serve on the Karen Women's Organisation (KWO) committee and unofficially help to run a boarding house for separated children. Second, even before actual departure takes place, some individuals who are resettling leave jobs early. For example, some help rebuild their family's house before the rainy season. Others want to learn or improve their English before resettling. Others are simply no longer interested in working. Whatever the reasons, the replacement time that NGOs have to replace their staff is often shorter than departure numbers would indicate. Third, individuals accepted for resettlement are required to undergo a medical exam and cultural orientation, which takes them out of the camp and out of their jobs for still more time (two or three days).

#### **4.1 Factors influencing depletion of skilled workers**

That these three populations (educated, NGOs workers, and experienced/leaders – very often correlated with one another) are resettling in higher percentages than the rest of the population is the result of several factors. These reasons are discussed below, briefly, to demonstrate that no one organisation or group is responsible for the depletion of skilled and educated from the camp population.

First, the educated want to resettle in higher percentages than the total camp population. They are less intimidated by the outside world, and they believe that because of their jobs in the camps and/or their English abilities, they will be able to secure better jobs in third countries. The members of this group also have more access to information about resettlement within the camp community simply because of their daily contact with the outside world. Hence it is not surprising that, averaged across all nine camps, 37.7% of the entire population has expressed an interest in resettlement, while 61.2% of the post-10 population has.<sup>9</sup>

Second, UNHCR's resettlement criteria follow a 'first-in, first-out' procedure, wherein refugees who arrived in Thailand first are among the first to be submitted by UNHCR to resettlement countries.<sup>10</sup> Where the educated have been in the camps for a long time, the educated will have the opportunity to resettle first. Furthermore, it is logical to assume that those who have been in the camps for a longer duration have more experience working with NGOs, and UNHCR's criteria compound the quicker resettlement of this population as well.

Third, some resettlement countries emphasize the importance of integration potential in selecting candidates for resettlement. In these instances, the fact that the skilled apply in

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<sup>9</sup> This finding only provides the slimmest evidence, because, as noted in Appendix A, expressions of resettlement interest are not systematically accurate across camps.

<sup>10</sup> There are some exceptions to this format. See UNHCR's 'Guidelines and Procedures for the Identification of Myanmar Refugees for Resettlement Submission' (Appendix B) for more information.

higher proportions, and are sometimes submitted in higher proportions, is compounded by the fact that some resettlement countries accept the skilled in higher proportions. Thus, while only 7.7% of the total camp population has been accepted for resettlement, 19.6% of the post-10 population has been accepted.

These factors indicate that even if resettlement only occurred through group referrals, in which all refugees were accepted regardless of education and skills, the issue of depletion of skilled workers would still arise.

#### ***4.2 Limited labour pool and the difficulty of replacement***

As the skilled and educated leave, it is increasingly difficult to find replacements within the existing population. Since refugee camps are not an open labour market, there is a limited supply of skilled workers for the jobs necessary in the camp population. In some camps, virtually every post-10 graduate is already employed.

An aggregate examination of the current needs of the camps in relation to the education level of camp employees illustrates how difficult replacement is, and will continue to be, over time. The following paragraphs examine the post-10 population because its members are easily quantifiable, but the difficulties that this analysis depicts are also evident in the related populations of skilled and experienced, which are more difficult to quantify.

Research conducted for this report shows that of a total camp employee population of just over 7,000, approximately 911 require a post-10 education in order to maintain the current level of services in the camps.<sup>11</sup>

UNHCR data indicate that the entire post-10 adult population (excluding new arrivals and other unregistered residents) is 1,979, which might, at first glance, garner little concern, since all 911 post-10 graduates could resettle and there would still be a pool of 1,069 post-10 graduates to fill the required jobs.

However, of the 1,979 post-10 graduates in the adult population, 388 have already been accepted for resettlement, an additional 550 have had their applications submitted by UNHCR for resettlement to third countries, and an additional 263 have expressed an interest in resettlement. This means that, of the 1,979 post-10 graduates in the adult population, 1,201 are at some stage in the process of considering or seeking resettlement. If, for instance, all 1,201 were able to depart for resettlement tomorrow, there would remain in the camps fewer than the 911 post-10 graduates needed to run the camps as they function now. Of course, not all who want to resettle can depart tomorrow, but this scenario illustrates why the timing of the process is so important for replacing and training new workers.

It is impossible to predict with perfect accuracy when individuals will resettle, but conversations with the staff of UNHCR, IOM, and resettlement countries have yielded some relatively reasonable assumptions about the percentages likely to resettle in given time periods from different camps. A projection of the departures of the post-10 educated population reveals that within six months, the post-10 population will have decreased by 38% across all camps, while the total population of the camps will only have decreased by 10%. In addition, although a decrease in the total population of the camp will mean that some camp-based positions will not be necessary, the need will not

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<sup>11</sup> A comprehensive explanation of how this data were collected can be found in Appendix C.

decrease exactly commensurate with the total population, thus heightening the problem of fewer skilled workers. Within 18 months (by the end of 2008), the number of post-10 camp residents will be at a critically low level; unless responses are crafted and implemented immediately, there will not be sufficient numbers of appropriately educated camp residents to carry out necessary camp functions.<sup>12</sup> Data analyses to support these findings can be found in Appendices C and D.

Stakeholders throughout the camps, across the sectors, reported the importance not only of educational qualifications but also the value of long-term experience, authority that often comes with age, and status. For example, a young, bright post-10 graduate may have the English skills necessary to do effective translations, and she may be educated in the appropriate subject matter. Nevertheless, as noted by one educator, she would likely have a difficult time managing a school with 40-year old teachers.<sup>13</sup>

Further, while NGOs have already begun to respond to the loss of workers by developing short-term trainings, these do not easily replace institutional memory and tacit knowledge built up through a capacity-building approach over many years. The challenge of training new workers is compounded by the longevity of service by camp-based staff who are departing and the nature of the organisational structures that have supported these staff thus far. As will be noted in the sectoral analyses, NGOs built capacity among camp-based staff on the assumption that these staff could serve as the institutional memories of their respective organisations. This partially explains why NGOs are having a more difficult time training new staff: 'They have to be told the same thing three times,' one NGO staff member noted.<sup>14</sup>

The pressure to train new workers, juggle staff to fill gaps, and continue to offer the same quality of programs affects not only the camp-based staff, but NGO expatriate and national (henceforth 'town-based') staff as well. As one NGO program manager noted, in a sentiment echoed by many NGO administrators and staff, 'We have to achieve the same project results...but we have to do it with fewer (camp) staff and fewer interpreters. So (we feel) the pressure more here in the office.'<sup>15</sup>

Finally, while NGOs are already faced with the task of replacing experienced and educated workers, many report the further challenge of retaining replacement staff. This is because NGOs are starting to witness – immediate or anticipated – the resettlement of 'second-liners', or those who have been trained as replacements. Thus, supervisors and coordinators with several years' experience were replaced by their assistants or deputies, who, while never serving in the particular role of supervisor, at the very least understood the machinations of the jobs. Now, these second-liners are departing, and their replacements (who were their assistants and deputies perhaps for weeks or months) have significantly less experience than the second-liners who preceded them. This concern was expressed in Nu Po where NGOs have manoeuvred creatively to find a new hospital director. But if he (the replacement) leaves, notes the Camp Committee Health Coordinator, 'We don't know what we will do. He is the last one we can find.'<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> This estimate does not account for: 1) second-wave levels of interest, which might increase the rate and number of departures and 2) unregistered camp residents, which might alleviate the effects of resettlement in the short term.

<sup>13</sup> Fred Ligon, Project Director, World Education/Consortium. Mae Sot, 24 April 2007.

<sup>14</sup> Confidential interview. Mae La, May 2007.

<sup>15</sup> Marc van der Stouwe, Program Manager, ZOA Refugee Care. Mae Sot, 24 April 2007.

<sup>16</sup> Naw Doreena, Camp Committee Health Coordinator. Nu Po, 3 May 2007.

### **4.3 Mood in the camps in the context of resettlement**

A range of emotions surrounds the topic of resettlement, making it difficult to generalise reactions across the camp population. In all camps, it is a common topic for discussion, referred to as ‘the buzz of resettlement’ or ‘resettlement fever.’<sup>17</sup> One phrase to aptly capture the complexity of the mood in the camps is the Karenni phrase *chuwa ma yeh, ga ma yeh* (‘difficult to move forward, difficult to move back’), which characterises the sense of ambiguity that resettlement prospects have brought to the camp. For a population that has been in prolonged limbo, resettlement represents the promise of a better future with opportunities for a new life, particularly in the absence of other durable solutions. However, it also represents the threat of losing the dream of return home, and the fear of the unknown. Interviews with camp residents demonstrated the contrasting emotions of a sense of hope and expectation for those resettling, depression and anger for those rejected, anxiety for those who are still waiting to hear the final decision, and confusion for those who have not yet decided what they want to do.

In addition, particularly in camps where resettlement is in more advanced stages, camp residents have noted that some accepted for resettlement have ceased participating in camp activities. For example, some resettling students either drop out of school or lack attention in the classroom and some camp employees either quit their jobs or are distracted in their performance.<sup>18</sup> This can add to the loss of morale for those who remain, as the former’s lack of concentration feeds into the latter’s sense of being left behind. ‘We get people to replace (those who resettle), but the new work is hard, and we feel sorrow when they leave,’ noted one camp resident who does not want to resettle.<sup>19</sup>

The following three sections offer composite observations about the impact of the resettlement on the education, health, and camp administration sectors, respectively, and the current and future programmatic responses to each. Due to the specificity of each camp, these findings are based on a wide range of consultations with stakeholders across the camps and NGOs, but not uniformly generalised to all camps.

## **5. EDUCATION**

### **5.1 Overall Impact on Education Sector**

Despite an evolved system of primary, secondary, and post-10 education in the camps, the pursuit of higher education is extremely difficult for camp residents. Ironically, this lack of education is one of the primary reasons for which members of the educated population are seeking resettlement — to pursue better educational opportunities for themselves and their children. And it is part of the reason why maintaining the quality of the current education programs is so important.

The education sector employs, by far, the largest number of camp refugees. Altogether, teachers, principals, teacher trainers, educators in schools, special education, post-10,

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<sup>17</sup> Resettlement’s popularity as a conversation topic did not emerge solely because of the authors’ visits. For example, CBO-sponsored resettlement workshops and seminars preceded, and will follow, their visits.

<sup>18</sup> This phenomenon, under very different circumstances, has been termed ‘senioritis’ to describe what happens to high school seniors who are already accepted into university. With one foot out the door, they commonly stop focusing on their present and think about the future.

<sup>19</sup> Confidential interview with camp resident. Mae La Oon, April 2007

vocational training (VT), non-formal education (NFE), and other associated staff comprise 3,400 workers in the camps, just under half of the total of 7,000. The sheer number of educators means that not all can resettle immediately, but the following selected figures demonstrate that educators are considering/seeking/have been accepted for resettlement in disproportionate numbers to the rest of the population. The following figures come from interviews with stakeholders in central and local offices.

- In Tham Hin, where resettlement is furthest along in the process, 130 of 131 current educators have applied for resettlement. Recently the education sub-committee has chosen to scale back the post-10 school to offer only computer and English to its remaining students, since the education staff is needed for other schools.
- In Tham Hin, virtually the entire staff of Right to Play (RTP) departed, and the vast majority of the volunteer coaches have either departed or have applied. RTP works with a critical young adult population, to deliver activities to children, which is important for those who need an outlet, particularly now that the post-10 school has been scaled back. But replacing the entire staff, in addition to an excellent master trainer, poses problems for the program.<sup>20</sup>
- In Mae La, Adventist Development and Relief Agency's (ADRA) Eden Valley Academy, whose students have in the past been likely candidates for camp educators, has witnessed a drop in enrolment from 70 to 17 for the coming school year.
- In Ban Nai Soi, 29 teachers, head teachers, and coordinators have departed for resettlement in 2006 and 2007. Despite the fact that only 2% of the total population has departed for resettlement, the departure of teachers over the past two years represents a decrease in the teaching population of more than 6%.
- In Mae La Oon, Handicap International's (HI) entire Mine Risk Education team has departed for resettlement. They are presently recruiting to replace all 6 positions.
- In Umpiem Mai, out of a total staff of 191 primary and secondary school teachers, 17 have departed for resettlement. This represents 9% of the entire teaching population, even though less than 2% of the entire camp population has departed.

As noted by one education project coordinator, finding teachers of quality has always been difficult, even prior to the advent of resettlement, and will continue to be so. Of greater concern, however, is the loss of supervisors, school principals, and other long-serving education staff.<sup>21</sup> These are individuals who have been trained over time in education tools such as curriculum development, classroom management, and school supervision. The loss of personnel who can provide educational guidance heightens the problem of losing long-serving teachers, influencing the quality of monitoring and training. One NGO staff member observed that when one of the post-10 camp schools lost its principal halfway through the school year, the associated NGOs and CBOs spent the remainder of the year 'trying to play catch up. Basically we never recovered.'<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Chris Morris, Field Coordinator, Right to Play. Mae Sot, 24 April 2007.

<sup>21</sup> Kelle Marin Rivers, Karenni Education Project Coordinator, Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS). Mae Hong Son, 15 April 2007.

<sup>22</sup> Confidential interview, post-10 school coordinator. April 2007.

While small in actual numbers, resident teacher trainers (RTTs) and subject coordinators in the camps are responsible for continual provision of subject-based training to the teachers. These positions ensure that the quality of teaching remains consistent across camps, since RTTs and subject coordinators attend summer trainings together in order to learn similar material. Education administrators report that the loss of RTTs is difficult to absorb, particularly in the subjects of math and science, where replacements were hard to find even in the absence of resettlement. The departure of even one or two RTTs in a camp has a significant impact on the education system because there are only between five and ten RTTs or subject coordinators in each camp:

- In Tham Hin, three RTTs have departed, three more have applied, and all, including all replacements, are interested in resettling.
- In Ban Nai Soi, six subject coordinators have already departed for resettlement.
- In Mae Ra Ma Luang, two RTTs have departed and four more have applied.
- In Mae La, eight RTTs are applying for resettlement.

The importance of supervisors, administrators, and RTTs demonstrates that even in camps where the number of students has begun to decrease significantly, the number of education staff cannot be decreased by commensurate ratios immediately. This is because some staff positions remain important independent of the number of students.

Because teachers receive lower remuneration than other NGO workers (such as those in the health sector), over time, losses in other sectors will compound the losses in the education sector, as teachers move into other jobs.

The capacity building approach adopted by education NGOs and CBOs was designed with repatriation in mind, specifically to empower refugees to conduct their own trainings, monitoring, and reporting. This very approach now makes the education system more vulnerable to decline, because many of the trainers and supervisors who took over for expatriate and/or national staff some years ago are now seeking resettlement, and there are few expatriate and national staff to fill in these roles as support. For example, ZOA Refugee Care The Netherlands' (ZOA) *2005 Education Survey* outlined a plan for the following three years with an eye toward preparing refugees for return. In that model, ZOA specifically moved from relief to development in order to empower refugees. This approach, ZOA's program manager concedes, now requires rethinking.<sup>23</sup>

In the present context of resettlement, some education content has shifted to resettling populations. For example, ZOA offers some VT specifically to help individuals find jobs in third countries, and has started an NFE program (English language for adults), which, although open to the whole adult population, has resettlement-focused content. While these programs are needed for the resettling population, the programs affect the resources of the remaining population because there is such a limited supply of educators. Thus, even if programs for resettling refugees are supported through different funding streams, their existence can sap the labour resources that were previously devoted to the entire camp population.

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<sup>23</sup> Marc van der Stouwe, Program Manager, ZOA Refugee Care. Mae Sot, 24 April 2007.

## **5.2 Actual and Anticipated Consequences of Resettlement on the Education Sector**

The early consequences of resettling education staff are just now emerging. But interviews with NGO agency staff, teachers, school principals, parents, and students reveal that there is already concern about the direction in which education programs are moving. Simply put, a decrease in the quality and availability of teaching staff will impact the education sector negatively, and over time, a decline in camp education will have reverberating effects on the rest of the camp population in terms of service delivery, as fewer individuals have sufficient education to work in high-level camp-based jobs.

Teacher trainings are already experiencing difficulties in finding suitable staff and maintaining the full courses previously offered. As noted above, RTTs are departing at a rapid rate, and these positions are often the most difficult to fill. In addition, courses such as the Teacher Preparation Course (TPC) and Karenni Teacher Training Centre (KnTTC) have traditionally been offered as two-year courses in order to fully prepare new teachers for their jobs, but because a faster turnover time is now required to ensure that there are teachers in the classroom, these courses are being shortened. Teaching courses of shorter duration translates into fewer hours for new staff to learn basic teaching skills and specific subject matters. This compounds the extant decrease in the availability and quality of teachers in the classroom. The results of losing quality teachers are difficult to measure and even more difficult to pinpoint and isolate causally, but it is clear that less experienced and less knowledgeable teachers simply cannot provide the depth and breadth in experience and skills of those who are resettling.

The situation of having teachers with fewer skills, less experience, and less confidence, combined with the aforementioned decrease in supervisors and administrators, has already started to have an effect on the classroom atmosphere. Supervisors are less capable of communicating daily problems, control and discipline worsens in the classroom, and fellowship within the teaching community suffers. Some resettling staff members are also distracted by their life to come, losing interest in their work or doing it half-heartedly, while remaining staff members experience a loss of morale as they have to work harder to fill the gaps while witnessing the departure of friends and colleagues. Students themselves are affected as well; in many camps, educators have noted a loss of student attention. Again, students focused on resettlement cease taking their studies seriously, while those students remaining are influenced by those around them seeking resettlement. The head of the Karen Education Department (KED) noted that in several schools in the seven Karen camps, exam scores in the past two years were lower than ever before.<sup>24</sup> This loss of concentration in the student population is harder to address in the context of teachers with less and less experience.

The loss of English teacher trainers and English teachers is likely to continue at a rapid pace, given the fact that English speakers have the best access to outside information and are often the most confident about life in a new country. Furthermore, they will become particularly sparse in the schools, because they can receive higher salaries working as interpreters for NGOs, UNHCR, and IOM. This sets the stage for fewer English language courses and an increasingly limited pool of English language speakers in the camps, which will result in NGOs relying on non-camp interpreters, increasing financial and administrative costs. In some areas, such as Mae Hong Son, non-camp interpreters are already limited in availability.

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<sup>24</sup> Thra La Say, Chairman, KED. Telephone interview, 7 May 2007.

It is anticipated that the decreasing availability/quality of supervisors and school principals will also result in a decreased ability to observe and monitor teachers; a decline in control and discipline at the school level; the closing/reorganizing of schools, possibly in the middle of the school year; and crucially, fewer staff capable of writing and submitting donor reports and proposals, thus decreasing the likelihood of securing and maintaining outside funding options.

While the problems listed above do point to challenging times ahead, two observations in particular provide a more positive reflection on the situation than that which generally emerged.

First, it was noted, particularly in the case of the Mae Hong Son camps, that whatever losses the camps suffered in terms of skilled workers, there would still be more educated individuals than at the time of the inception of the refugee camps. As one member of the Ban Mae Surin camp committee noted, 'We managed with the non-educated to begin with and we can do it again. From the beginning, all of us were only non-educated.'<sup>25</sup>

Second, resettlement has led to greater reluctance on the part of refugees intending to resettle to leave the camps without permission. This is because the consequences of being caught are greater: they might not be able to resettle if they break the law. Thus, there is an incentive for individuals to stay in the camps until resettlement occurs, and education NGOs are quick to rely on these individuals for teaching positions. This is only a short-term solution to the problem of replacing teachers, but is one on which the education system will likely rely.

### **5.3 Current and Possible Programmatic Responses to Resettlement: Coping Strategies**

Anticipating the loss of staff, most education NGOs have already begun to develop strategies in response. However, given the scarcity of qualified potential teachers and trainers, and the time required to offer sufficient preparation for new staff, several coping strategies have been envisioned or are already being implemented. These are programmatic decisions that may not be ideal, but are considered necessary given the current circumstances. The KED, for example, has already held several meetings with ZOA in order to determine its priorities in the 'worst case scenario.'

Coping strategies are presented in table form below:

| <b>Coping Strategy</b>    | <b>Likely Consequences</b>   | <b>Implementation/Comments</b>              |
|---------------------------|--|---|
| Close/consolidate schools | -Disorganisation during the school year<br>-Students must travel further to attend   | -Already implemented in Tham Hin and Mae La |
| Increase class size       | -More difficult for teachers<br>-Less attention for students   | -Thus far, not yet commonly done            |
| Two-shift system          | -Teachers work twice as many hours (a Karen Education Worker's Union [KEWU] representative said that this option would be 'just terrible' <sup>26</sup> )<br>-Students attend school for fewer hours | -Not yet implemented                        |
| Eliminate/scale down      | -Further drains the community of   | -KED has stated that they                   |

<sup>25</sup> Confidential interview, Ban Mae Surin camp committee member. Ban Mae Surin, 10 April 2007.

<sup>26</sup> Sah Pla Mae, KEWU member. Mae La, 26 April 2007.

| <b>Coping Strategy</b>  | <b>Likely Consequences</b>   | <b>Implementation/Comments</b>   |
|---|--|--|
| higher levels of education  | future skilled workers   | want to prioritise the continuation of the six post-10 schools that currently exist  |
| Continue all levels of instruction but reduce the number of subjects, thus requiring fewer teachers | -Requires fewer RTTs<br>-Means certain subjects (like math and science) suffer disproportionate losses   | -In Tham Hin, the post-10 school now only offers instruction in computer and English   |
| Eliminate/scale down non-essential (but beneficial) education programs                              | -Attendees of programs such as VT and NFE would have even fewer opportunities than they do now   | -Not yet implemented<br>-Tham Hin CC has stated that they want to prioritise the continuation of the NFE program   |
| Use of more expatriate/national staff   | -Represents a step backward in capacity building<br>-Expatriate and national staff are far more costly than camp-based staff, so requires more funding<br>-Sub-granting as a project strategy might not work as it has to date | -Mae Sot office of ZOA has increased its staff from 55 to 62 in past year<br>-At present, the RTG forbids the use of foreigners as teachers, so expatriates can only be trainers under current regulations |

#### **5.4 Sectoral Recommendations for Education**

Given the varying constraints and opportunities in each camp, the list below offers suggestions that have been raised in discussions with town-based staff, camp-based staff, program managers, and teachers. This is not a list of best practices; attempts to alleviate difficult human resource problems in the camps are too camp-specific for such an analysis. In addition to the recommendations below, refer to section 11 for general recommendations for all stakeholders.

1. Continue teacher trainings, increasing enrolment to anticipate that some will resettle.
  - a. The quality of teacher trainings will decrease as class size increases.
  - b. More costly.
  - c. Difficult to find qualified participants.
2. Shadow supervisors, teachers, and administrators, and continue to upgrade teachers who are already in the schools.
  - a. Important mechanism for passing on tacit knowledge of experienced staff.
  - b. Builds confidence for new staff.
  - c. Costly to provide stipends to assistants.
3. Encourage student participation by stressing the importance of education in resettling countries and for the pursuit of livelihoods in the camps.
4. Require students to complete final exams and graduate before head teacher signs KED/KnED certificate.
5. Insofar as possible, ensure that resources and programs allocated for educating resettling populations are also beneficial for those who remain (for example, promote VT and English programs that are relevant for the remaining population).
6. Ensure that the CCSDPT/ UNHCR Comprehensive Plan includes specific proposals to address gaps in education in the camps, for example, higher education.
7. Utilise resettled education staff for jobs that don't require face-to-face presence. (For example, WE/C has hired translators for education curricula, using email to

exchange documents, and translators can use the DRUM Publication Group's online Karen dictionary to help with translations.)

- a. Helps to maintain a connection between remaining and resettled population.
  - b. On the other hand, does not build capacity/experience of current camp-based staff.
  - c. Not all jobs are suitable for such work.
  - d. More costly than camp-based staff.
8. Continue to work with the RTG and Ministry of Education (MOE) to promote education opportunities for the refugee population.
- a. Support the current efforts of the MOE to accredit camp curriculum through the Thai education system.
  - b. Pursue long-distance learning opportunities, such as the Australian university collaboration granting 25 full scholarships for distance learning.
  - c. Attempt to increase the enrolment of refugees into Thai universities (there are 14 in the current academic year).
  - d. These efforts will mean losing potential teachers in the short term but preparing them to serve the community in the intermediate and long term.

## 6. HEALTH

### **6.1 Overall Impact on the Health Sector**

As with the education sector, the impact of resettlement on the health sector is already being strongly felt quantitatively and qualitatively. The numbers of camp-based health staff resettling are disproportionately high, with some programs losing 50% or more of their staff in 2007. Also, qualitatively, the health sector is experiencing the departure of some of its most experienced managerial and specialised staff members, who are particularly difficult to replace in the short and intermediate period. Further, in the context of the health sector (where training takes time and high levels of skill are required), the timing of resettlement is having impacts on the ability of the sector to find and train replacements, especially at more senior levels.

This substantial leakage of medical staff is illustrated in the following examples:

- In the Aide Médicale Internationale (AMI) program in Nu Po camp, 12 out of 22 medics have applied for resettlement in 2007; 9 out of 26 nurses have applied; 5 out of 5 Voluntary Counselling and Testing (VCT) counsellors, and 3 out of 4 psycho-social caregivers. According to AMI's figures, 49% of the total of the program has applied for resettlement.
- Similarly high numbers have applied from the American Refugee Committee (ARC) program for Nu Po. In the Community Health Education (CHE) program, 22 out of 35 resettled in 2006; in the Reproductive and Child Health (RCH) program, 11 out of 25 staff resettled in 2006; and 1 out of 6 in the Sexual and Gender-based Violence (SGBV) program resettled.
- In Mae La, AMI predicts that the number of medics will decrease from 35 to 17 by November. In addition, 35 of 72 Community Health Workers (CHWs) have applied for resettlement, including 8 of 9 CHW supervisors.

- Even in non-CCSDPT NGOs, such as PPAT, a large proportion of the staff has applied for or is interested in resettlement. At the time of the authors' visit to Mae Ra Ma Luang, for example, 7 out of 21 staff members were being processed for resettlement to Canada.
- Of 24 clinical staff at Ban Nai Soi, the Karenni Health Department (KnHD) and its implementing partner, the International Rescue Committee (IRC), expect to lose 14 to resettlement by July, including both senior and junior medics. 'We have eight weeks,' reported the IRC Field Coordinator, to develop a strategy to address a clinical staff decrease of more than 50%.<sup>27</sup>

Quantitative data alone does not provide the full picture of this impact on camp medical services. Qualitatively, the health sector is losing some of its most experienced, senior and important workers, such as managerial staff (hospital directors, supervisors) and senior medics. A review of IRC's Mae Hong Son health program, for example, highlighted the fact that inexperienced staff often move into senior positions.<sup>28</sup> And in Nu Po, of the 12 out of the 22 medics who have applied for resettlement, one includes the hospital director (discussed below), all have at least 5 years' experience, and half of the 12 have more than 10 years' experience.<sup>29</sup> Thus it is not only that programs are losing substantial numbers of their staff, but that they are losing years of accumulated experience, knowledge, and trust within the community.

In some camps, it is already difficult to find replacements for the most senior medical roles and this situation will become more pronounced if replacements of the original resettling staff also choose to resettle. In Nu Po camp, for example, a creative solution was developed in 2007 by the outgoing hospital director to replace her position by transferring the Umpiem medic-in-charge to Nu Po and promoting him to hospital director.<sup>30</sup> The transfer was arranged with sufficient time to allow the outgoing director to provide sufficient handover. Medical staff noted that in this case, there was adequate timing in the resettlement process to allow for this plan and implementation. However, as already noted, the Camp Committee Health Coordinator in Nu Po observed that if this new hospital director were to leave too, she could not think of anyone further to replace him.

Replacements may also be less experienced, as in the case of Ban Don Yang camp, where the American Refugee Committee (ARC) clinical program underwent a big change from having someone with 10 years' clinical experience to someone with 6 months' training and some experience as a KNU medic.<sup>31</sup> The additional workload created by gaps in staff combined with the additional training necessary – at least 3 months in the health sector – leaves supervisors over-stretched. For example, the ARC's Field Coordinator predicts that the clinical supervisor in Ban Don Yang this year (May to September) will be particularly 'stressed out' given her role in providing intensive training

<sup>27</sup> Jennifer Olson, Field Coordinator, IRC. Phone interview, 7 May 2007.

<sup>28</sup> 'A junior medic interviewed ...during September said he had been a medic for only one month; prior to this he had been a CHW for two years. He had received no training other than the four month CHW training course. This medic was on duty by himself in OPD for most of the morning of the interview day.' Wendy Venter, 'Mae Hong Son Health Program Review: Addressing Management Challenges in the Context of Staff Losses' (Thailand: IRC, October 2006), p. 10.

<sup>29</sup> Marie le Duc, AMI Aide Médicale Internationale, Umpiem/NuPo Project Manager. Umphang, 2 May 2007.

<sup>30</sup> The AMI hospital director in Nu Po was particularly experienced, having been originally trained by AMI in Burma, and having worked for MSF and AMI since. She was also widely trusted in the community, including by CBOs such as the KWO, whose members were very disappointed to see her leave. Interviews with AMI and Camp Committee Health Coordinator. Nu Po, 2 May 2007.

<sup>31</sup> Charles Schumacher, Field Coordinator, ARC. Umphang, 30 April 2007.

each day (6 hours, classroom-based, 5 days per week), combined with maintaining her routine supervision and coordination activities in the RCH and Community Health Education (CHE) programs.<sup>32</sup>

The challenges associated with the loss of supervisors and the strongest, most experienced staff are widespread in the sector, but in some programs it has not been felt as keenly. For instance, at the ARC CHE program in Nu Po, where the present supervisor (with ten years' experience as the supervisor and interpreter) is due to leave, major problems have not occurred. The program has prepared for resettlement by enhancing in-service mentoring and training of a small pool of 'assistant supervisors', from which ARC was able to recruit and train the supervisor's replacement.<sup>33</sup> Her replacement – also having worked in the program for 10 years (albeit at more junior levels) – was able to shadow for several months as assistant supervisor, adequately equipping him to take on the role. He does not, however, possess advanced interpreting skills which leaves a gap in the program previously provided by the outgoing supervisor.<sup>34</sup>

The role of skilled interpreters is particularly important in the health sector. Advanced levels of technical proficiency and skill are developed over long periods and these positions are not easily or quickly replaced. Interpreters in the health sector require specialised technical proficiency in a number of languages (including English, Burmese, Karen, and, ideally in the two Mae Hong Son camps, Karenni). Finding suitably qualified staff was a challenge even before resettlement. A preliminary assessment of the number of camp-based workers needed to have English proficiency reveals that the health sector requires the most: of approximately 250 camp-based technical English speakers needed to run the camps, 184 (75%) are in the health sector.<sup>35</sup>

The present scale and timing of resettlement is impacting the health sector as it strives to maintain the numbers and quality of staff required to run health services. Because trainings in the health sector take at least 3 months, replacements for medics, nurses, and midwives require substantial efforts and resources over a longer period.

In skilled positions, some agencies are already struggling to maintain quality in terms of obtaining replacements with the level of education required to undertake the job. For example, where a role might have in the past required a post-10 education (plus some experience), the limited supply of this level of educated human resources in the camp means that programs have had to hire less qualified people. This is occurring in some camps, such as in ARC's RCH program in Umpiem Mai, where ARC struggled to find qualified replacements. According to the RCH's in-camp supervisor, the program made vacancy announcements for post-10 applicants but could only get those who had completed 8<sup>th</sup> standard. Less qualified workers notwithstanding, the supervisor noted that the newer staff is highly motivated.<sup>36</sup>

A further impact of the need for increased trainings to meet replacement needs is on the gaps in staffing levels this produces. Staff members who are undertaking offsite or theoretical trainings are unavailable for work. For instance, medical programs are

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<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> Such shadowing is a form of best practice to which we will refer later, in the recommendations section.

<sup>34</sup> Isabella Tun and Saw Wilbert, Supervisor and Assistant Supervisor, ARC CHE program. Nu Po camp, 3 May 2007.

<sup>35</sup> See Appendix C for more information. It has been more difficult, however, to gauge the number (and percentage of the total population) of English speakers who are departing for resettlement, and also the overall pool available in the camps.

<sup>36</sup> Paw Shee, RCH Supervisor, ARC. Umpiem Mai, 25 April 2007.

addressing the shortage of medics by upgrading nurses with six months' medic trainings. With the minimum training for medics being six months, programs have to continue without the full quota of staff for extended periods. For example, the Nu Po RCH program was five people short for six months of 2006 (May-October).

Medical programs have needed to address these gaps in staffing by using such methods as shift systems, such as in Umpiem Mai, where staff members are undertaking two shifts of twelve hours per day, rather than the usual three shifts of eight hours each. They have also had to juggle schedules, which they report as tiring.<sup>37</sup>

Members of staff in medical programs also have the burden of additional workloads, such as in the case of the outflow of midwives from Mae La, which has approximately 1,500 deliveries per year. Because midwives are generally the only staff who attend the deliveries, as their numbers decline, non-delivery room tasks, such as treating pregnant women for malaria or kidney infection, have been offloaded to medics and nurses (whose numbers also decline).<sup>38</sup>

A further point highlighted by medical staff is that these impacts in some cases extend beyond the immediate camp population – to Affected Thai Villages (ATVs), for instance, and to special cases in which camps provide health care services to 'outsider' patients. For example, in Nu Po, 30% of those frequenting the Inpatient Departments (IPD) and Outpatient Departments (OPD) of the camp are 'outsiders' – ATVs and people from Karen State.<sup>39</sup>

The stress of long hours and fewer staff does not only affect the work of camp-based staff. In addition, there is also increased pressure on the town-based staff of medical NGOs. They have more administrative work to plan trainings and more clinical work in the camps to fill gaps. 'It's not just the camp community of health workers who are demoralised,' notes one NGO medical staff supervisor, 'it's the (international and national) NGO staff.'<sup>40</sup>

Whilst there is a high number of medical staff resettling or interested in resettling from all camp-based medical programs, a small proportion of medical staff in particular are likely to remain. These include highly experienced, skilled individuals who for a number of reasons – such as family commitments across the border or a commitment to continuing their work in the camps – have stated that they plan to remain in their jobs in the camps.

## **6.2 Actual and Anticipated Consequences of Resettlement on the Health Sector**

This section outlines reported consequences – existing and anticipated – of decreased number and quality of staff in the health sector. It considers also the effects that flow onto medical supervision and coordination, as well as the impact on the quality of trainings in the context of the availability of fewer senior medics. In those camps where resettlement is at a more advanced stage, some of these effects are occurring now, whilst in other camps they are more distant concerns. The impacts are discussed in the areas of medics, nurses and lab workers, midwives, Community Health Educators (CHEs) and Community Health Workers (CHWs), water and sanitation, and Community Social Workers (CSWs).

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<sup>37</sup> Saw Dah, Head Medic, AMI Hospital. Umpiem Mai, 25 April 2007.

<sup>38</sup> Rose McGready, Shoklo Malaria Research Unit (SMRU). Telephone interview, 10 May 2007.

<sup>39</sup> The individuals coming from Karen State are in reportedly in very poor health. Isabella Tun, Supervisor, ARC CHE program. Nu Po camp, 3 May 2007.

<sup>40</sup> Jennifer Olson, Field Coordinator, IRC. Telephone interview, 7 May 2007.

Given fewer and less experienced medics, anticipated consequences include a general decline in the overall quality of health care, the risk of misdiagnosis, a reported loss of confidence by patients in medical services (quite common in some of the camps already), the trend toward patients presenting when conditions become more severe, an increase in the number of hospital referrals, as well as the risks of worsening rates for basic health indicators. With fewer and less experienced nurses and lab workers in the system, compounded by stresses on training and programmatic capacity, reported risks include increasing under-nutrition, communicable disease outbreak, and potential problems in program coverage of preventative health (including immunisation, supplementary feeding, and growth monitoring).

In the area of RCH programs, fewer and less experienced midwives have generated concerns about a declining capacity to attend to antenatal and postnatal care, less confidence in attending to emergency cases, and concerns around maintaining high standards to prevent maternal and infant mortality. With fewer and less experienced CHEs and CSWs, stakeholders expressed concerns about maintaining strong community relationships with the staff (more difficult with rapid staff turnover and hiring of less experienced people), increased risk of communicable disease outbreaks, failure to recognise and diagnose symptoms in a timely way, and the inability to pass on tacit knowledge (for example, on nutrition education, food security) to rotating expatriate staff. Staff turnover in the area of water and sanitation is not yet occurring at a high level, but teams expressed the need to continue a high quality of monitoring in order to prevent waterborne illnesses. A decrease in numbers and experience levels of CSWs presents the risk of a declining ability to address psycho-social trauma (already present in the camps) and manage risks of violent and/or anti-social behaviour in the camps

Stakeholders identified the challenge of maintaining a high level of medical supervision and coordination by senior medics. Concerns with the resettlement of so many senior and experienced medics also extend to the need to maintain the larger communication networks and flows within the camp, such as with the CC and the *palat*. Other consequences to address are the increasing workload placed on the remaining health agency staff, both camp-based and town-based, to handle administrative affairs. Stresses leading to a decline in staff morale were also identified.

The departure of the most senior and qualified medics, has, in some programs, affected medical training programs adversely. This presents obstacles not only of growing costs but, as noted above, qualitative challenges that flow into growing workloads on remaining staff and a lower pool of highly experienced trainers to supervise and interpret. Also, when a program loses interpreters, it must use other staff (such as a supervisor who has the technical proficiency) to interpret during trainings, which places additional pressure on the program.

### **6.3 Current and Possible Programmatic Responses to Resettlement: Coping Strategies**

As in the education sector, health NGOs and CBOs have resorted to several coping strategies to respond to the pressing and immediate issue of loss of skilled workers in the camps. These strategies are not ideal, but they are considered necessary in order to continue the effective functioning of health services in the camps.

Coping strategies are presented in table form below:

| <b>Coping Strategy</b>  | <b>Likely Consequences/Comments</b>  | <b>Implementation</b>   |
|---|--|---|
| Rely on more expatriate/national staff for clinical practice and training                       | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-More costly, especially western doctors</li> <li>-In general, camp community is (at least initially) reluctant to go to Thai or Burmese doctors</li> <li>-Hiring Thai doctors and nurses away from local hospitals could damage camp-hospital relations</li> </ul>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Tham Hin, the MHS camps, and Mae La have all increased the number of foreign clinicians and trainers working in the camps.</li> <li>- Camp population have been wary of Thai and Burmese doctors. For example, AMI tried to hire a Burmese doctor for the program in Mae La, Umpiem Mai and Nu Po, but camp-based staff rejected the idea. Thus very difficult to recruit from outside the community.</li> <li>- The ARC clinical program in Ban Don Yang attempted to recruit medics from the Mon community in Sangklaburi, but the Karen community did not trust the Mon coming in the camp to work.</li> </ul> |
| Increase duration of hospital shifts  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-More difficult for medics and nurses</li> <li>-Less attention for patients</li> </ul>  | -Umpiem Mai moved from 8-hour to 12-hour shifts   |
| Close clinics   | -More difficult for patients to access the remaining clinic  | -Given rapid decrease in medics in Ban Nai Soi in next 2 months, IRC is considering closing one of its clinics  |
| Increase hospital referrals   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-More costly</li> <li>-More administrative burden on NGOs, as they must complete release forms for all patients</li> </ul>  | -Already occurring in some camps, although difficult to link increase in referrals specifically to decrease in skilled staff  |
| Train and employ unregistered residents   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-It may be that a significant portion of the unregistered population is interested in resettlement; in that case, investment in this population could be counter-productive</li> <li>-Availability of educated unregistered population varies among camps</li> <li>-In some camps, difficult to employ because of RTG restrictions</li> </ul> | -Occurring in Tham Hin, Mae La, and, to a lesser extent, in the camps in Mae Sariang  |
| Use of (less costly) volunteers for training, such as AVI (Australian Volunteers International) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Difficult to find qualified and reliable volunteers</li> <li>-Only suitable for specific training modules</li> <li>-Does not ensure continuity</li> </ul>  | -Not implemented, although a proposal has been submitted by IRC for Ban Nai Soi and Ban Mae Surin   |

#### **6.4 Sectoral Recommendations**

Given the fact that the health sector has already begun to implement various coping strategies, it is clear that even the best recommendations come with difficult consequences. The following outline represents a summary of the activities and programs that are being attempted by NGO and CBO staff in order to continue to provide sufficient health services within the camps. This is not a list of best practices; attempts to alleviate difficult human resource problems in the camps are too camp-

specific for such analysis. In addition to the recommendations below, refer to section 11 for general recommendations for all stakeholders.

- 1) Continue trainings for medics, nurses, midwives, lab technicians, community health workers, and community social workers.
  - (a) Trainings (whether based in camps or outside of them) are necessary for staff in all camps, even those where resettlement is just beginning.
  - (b) For many camps, long-term trainings have not been conducted in several years (for example, AMI has reintroduced trainings that have not been necessary since 1994).
  - (c) Difficult to recruit enough educated individuals for the higher level positions.
  - (d) Not enough time to train medics and nurses for replacement.
  - (e) Difficult to anticipate how many staff to train (some agencies are developing tools to predict the number of workers who will remain).
  - (f) Some agencies are training more staff than necessary in order to anticipate that some will resettle. However, this strategy is costly, and it also means that “extra” workers will not have a chance to practice their skills after being trained.
- 2) In order to respond to immediate and urgent need for medical staff, implement phased trainings, wherein those with some medical experience (such as nurses, midwives, or CHWs) are promoted after short-term training.
  - (a) While an effective strategy for responding to limited replacement time in the short term, it represents a patchwork solution that does not build core strengths for remaining staff in specific positions.
  - (b) Places more burden on international/national/local health agency staff to conduct different trainings with great frequency.
- 3) Consider the possibility of centralised trainings for some topics.
  - (a) Allows medical staff from along entire border to receive similar training.
  - (b) Difficult to transport staff for long term trainings, as it is necessary to obtain permission from MOI and pay for transport.
  - (c) Practical part of trainings should occur in residents’ own camps in order to begin replacement process.
- 4) Hire borderwide clinical trainer and standardise curriculum for some positions.
  - (a) Some standardisation is already occurring (Malteser International is using ARC midwife training manual, for example).
  - (b) Might not work for CHE or lab trainings because for these topics, in-service training is the most important.
  - (c) Improves standardised clinical training for new medics, which is important not only in the context of resettlement.
  - (d) Medical staff do not have to travel, thus reducing administrative burden on NGO.
  - (e) Does not build doctor-clinical staff relationships as effectively, since trainer would be moving from place to place.
- 5) Hire expatriate / national staff for longer term contracts to ensure continuity of camp-specific knowledge (such as supplementary feeding, nutrition demonstrations, immunizations).

- (a) Provides more consistent support for camp-based medical staff.
  - (b) Improves patient confidence.
  - (c) May be difficult to lengthen contracts for some agencies.
- 6) Consider the possibility of sending clinical staff to Mae Tao clinic for intensive trainings.
- (a) Mae Tao has excellent training capacity and already has a training system in place.
  - (b) Has potential to produce medics, nurses, and midwives with standardised cross-border practices.
  - (c) Given the outflow of medics, however, Mae Tao is itself losing critical staff and is looking to replace its own.
  - (d) As with other town-based trainings, obtaining permission for camp residents to exit and travel is an administrative burden.
  - (e) Mae Tao not only educates, but houses and feeds its trainees. NGOs must budget to pay Mae Tao appropriately (cost varies depending on training).

## 7. CAMP ADMINISTRATION

### 7.1 Overall findings

As in the case of the education and health sectors above, camp administration is built on the development of local capacity. A noteworthy trait of these camps along the Thai-Burmese border is that they are almost entirely internally administered by people drawn from the camp community itself. As expected, camp committees (CCs) – as well as their coordinating structures, the Karen Refugee Committee (KRC) and Karenni Refugee Committee (KnRC) – and community-based organisations (CBOs) are intensely occupied with understanding and finding ways to mitigate the more challenging and negative impacts of resettlement on the camp community.

Nearly all CCs are preoccupied with the impacts of ‘resettlement fever’. They share concerns with NGOs about losing the most skilled, educated, and experienced staff from the camp programs, particularly as this impacts the health and education sectors. Some CCs are particularly outspoken about the timing and impact of resettlement on camp programs and the community more broadly.

Refugee Committees (RCs) do not work directly in the camps, but instead coordinate with CCs and play an advisory role with the Thai authorities. Resettlement of RC staff has not dramatically impacted the functioning of the RCs to date, however gaps open when key people depart. For example, the KRC has been unable to find a replacement since the departure of their Vice Chairperson in 2006. The impact has been additional workload for the RC, prompting a member of the KRC to comment that ‘You can replace people, but you can’t replace commitment’.<sup>41</sup> Thus when long-serving key people leave the camp, gaps remain unfilled due to the personal standing and capacities of highly experienced and committed staff. While the effect of resettlement has been minimal on RCs thus far, it is worth emphasizing that relationships with Thai authorities are a key aspect of the work of RCs. If, in the future, RC turnover was so high that it damaged

<sup>41</sup> Saw George, Executive Committee Member, Karen Refugee Committee. Mae Sot, 27 April 2007.

relationships with local or national Thai authorities, this could influence the ability of the camps to obtain key services and assistance.

## **7.2 Camp Committees**

Consultations with CCs found that the impact of resettlement on their own numbers of staff has thus far been manageable given the way in which their structures operate allowing for the relatively smooth succession of staff into these roles. For instance, key positions sometimes have two coordinators or a vice- or deputy- role.

Overall, comparatively small numbers of CC staff (particularly those in key roles) have departed or applied for resettlement, although in some camps the proportions are higher:

- In Tham Hin, 6 of 15 CC members have departed for resettlement.
- In Umpiem Mai, 3 EC members out of a total of 21 are awaiting resettlement. (1 Health Coordinator and the 2 Auditors).
- According to consultations with the Umpiem Mai CC, a further 6 non-EC CC staff (out of a total of 248) has also applied.
- In 2006, the Camp Secretary (an EC member) departed for resettlement, resulting in the loss of considerable experience and institutional knowledge (spanning 1985-2006). The CC EC experienced some difficulties in replacing him. Roles such as these require a highly developed set of skills and knowledge of camp management, and gaps in key personnel result in extra workload falling on the remaining EC.<sup>42</sup>
- In Mae La camp, larger numbers of CC staff have left and/or applied for resettlement – all three Zone Secretaries, and on the EC, the Vice Chairperson and Joint Secretary are awaiting resettlement.
- Of the 21 staff on main committees in Mae La, 7 will depart for resettlement this year. Four out of five of the women on the CC will resettle.

In view of the impact on camp services – particularly in the health and education sectors – CCs expressed particular interest in improving the predictability of timing in the resettlement process. CCs highlighted the importance of obtaining clearer information about the timing of resettlement so that camp programs can make adequate preparations for replacement staff handovers. As well, CBOs would like to see resettlement agencies/countries take the timing of key dates (such as school semesters) into consideration to avoid compounding disruptions to beneficiaries.

A further finding from CC discussions, as well as with CBOs, is the need for more clear and balanced information about resettlement countries themselves. The staff in one CBO reflected the sentiment as people ‘applying with their eyes closed’.<sup>43</sup> Camp administrators identified the need for more extensive and accurate information on resettlement countries so that individuals and families can make more informed decisions.

## **7.3 CBOs**

Departures of staff from camp-based CBOs are occurring in comparatively smaller proportions than from NGOs. The leaders of CBOs, however, often hold other positions, and it is the links between CBOs and NGOs that suffer with their departure.

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<sup>42</sup> Interviews, Camp Chairperson, Health and Education Coordinators, and other CC members. Umpiem Mai, 25 and 26 April 2007.

<sup>43</sup> Confidential interview, CBO, Nu Po, 1 May 2007.

- In KWO in Mae Ra Ma Luang, 9 out of a total of 70 KWO camp members have applied for resettlement, including 2 out of 9 KWO EC members.
- The NGO Drug Awareness Rehabilitation Education (DARE) has lost all but one of its 5 staff at Tham Hin, and every one of the 10 staff at Umpiem Mai is in the process of applying.
- In Karen Young Women's Leadership School (KYWLS) in Mae Ra Ma Luang, 2 out of 4 teachers have applied for resettlement to Canada – both from senior roles as Headmistress and Assistant Headmistress.

Qualitatively, remaining KYWLS staff expressed that the impact of the departure of the most experienced staff on the organisation has resulted in a loss of confidence and morale for remaining teachers. In some cases, CBOs are losing members held in high regard by the community, such as in Mae La camp, where the departure of the KWO chairwoman is widely noted as a loss to the KWO and to the camp as a whole. Specifically, the outgoing chairwoman noted, the head of the KWO needs to have 'endurance and a concrete heart.' Given the fact that most of the women who have completed leadership training have already departed, she cited specific concerns after her impending departure. First, in Mae La, women with strong voices have sat most recently on the justice committee of the camp committee, and their departure will make it more difficult to protect women in the camps. Similarly, women suffering from SGBV need strong women to insist that their husbands stay away from them, often by shielding them in safehouses.<sup>44</sup> Finally, the KWO has played an important role in organizing and administering the boarding houses in which separated children live. At this point, boarding houses are organised by committee, and there is no immediate concern for their deterioration. However, she noted, it is an important area to keep in mind for future concern.<sup>45</sup>

Other CBOs, such as the Karen Students Network Group (KSNG), are not experiencing departures of staff for resettlement and have not expressed significant concerns about the impact of resettlement at this stage.<sup>46</sup>

A further consideration emerging from consultations with CBOs concerns the impact of resettlement from counterpart NGOs on CBOs themselves and on the wider quality of camp services, especially in the health and education sectors. As noted, the impact of the departure of key NGO staff counterparts is not restricted to the functioning of the NGO itself, because key supportive relationships between NGO and CBO staff members are developed over time. For example, KWO members in Nu Po mentioned that the supportive relationships with other CBOs, NGOs, and the CC provided them with sufficient help to absorb the changes within their own organisation. At the same time, the departure of a long-term, key and trusted staff member in a main counterpart organisation had a negative impact on morale and support. The KWO explained that the imminent departure of the long-serving AMI hospital director (noted above) was a significant loss in terms of capacity she provided in supporting their work in the camp (health, SGBV, etc.), as well as the level of trust and substance in the CBO/NGO relationship they had developed over 10 years. Such departures stem the benefits of capacity building and lower morale.

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<sup>44</sup> This problem is reinforced by the departure of SGBV staff from the camps, as noted in the Health sector section.

<sup>45</sup> Leh Leh Win, KWO outgoing chairwoman. Mae La, 25 April 2007.

<sup>46</sup> Thoo Lay Doh Soe, KSNG. Nu Po, 1 May 2007.

As the overall pool of skilled, educated and experienced people in the camp decreases, NGOs search for the best available staff. In this situation, it is anticipated that NGOs will inevitably compete for the available qualified camp-based people serving in CBOs. Also, as the overall pool of skilled workers available is reduced, people recruited to work full-time in NGOs will have less time to dedicate to working with CBOs, which generally do not pay stipends.

Along with CCs, a number of CBOs expressed overwhelming concerns about the rapid pace of resettlement and a lack of information and consultation on the part of resettlement countries, UNHCR, and IOM. CBOs in Mae Sariang noted that their half-day workshop convened for this CCSDPT-commissioned report was the first time that they felt their concerns and perspectives were being heard.<sup>47</sup> Resettlement is clearly a sensitive issue, prompting a number of Karen and Karenni CBOs to prepare formal statements on the matter.<sup>48</sup> Prominent concerns regarding the impact of resettlement include:

- CBOs believe the timing of resettlement is happening too quickly for them to adequately prepare;
- there is a lack of adequate information about resettlement countries, and the realities of life and services provided to newly settled refugees there;
- there is a concern about the additional human resource and financial pressures placed on CBOs due to resettlement. For example, the KWO has put together a detailed Handover Manual for its replacements and it operates a Family Contact Project, which requires additional time and resources;
- departures of skilled, educated, and experienced staff from NGOs affects not only CBOs in camps, but also extends beyond the camps inside Burma where communities/CBOs have drawn on camp models and skills;
- many of the CBOs work both within the camps and inside Burma;
- there is concern about the impact on future experienced teachers, medics, administrators, etc., available to work in Karen State in the future; and
- stakeholders were encouraged to continue to work for the achievement of other durable solutions – local integration (also permitting greater access to work in Thailand, enhancing access to vocational and educational opportunities in Thailand) as well as change in Burma to enable a future safe and voluntary return of the refugees.

There are two additional issues concerning the impact of resettlement on CBOs that should be recognised. First, discussions with several CBO leaders revealed that educated and experienced members of CBOs have, in the past, been instrumental in writing funding proposals to donors in order to secure seed funding for small projects in the camps. When individuals with these skills depart, it may drain the resources of CBOs still further. Second, in some camps, particularly in Mae La, camp committee members noted that they were expected to contribute their time and energy to aiding the resettlement process. For example, section and zone leaders reported having been asked to find and retrieve camp residents for UNHCR interviews. ‘We don’t have time for

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<sup>47</sup> CBO roundtable on the impact of resettlement, hosted by the KWO, Mae Sariang, 20 April 2007.

<sup>48</sup> See ‘The Karen Community Based Organisations’ Concerns and Recommendations on Resettlement’ (8 March 2007) and ‘Resettlement Workshop: Karenni Community, Statement’ 28 November 2006. Dozens of CBOs have signed these respective documents, which lay out the concerns listed above.

any of our own activities,' one camp committee member lamented. CC members further reported that they were not compensated for their time.<sup>49</sup>

#### **7.4 CBO and Camp Committee Recommendations**

As with recommendations in the education and health sectors, the recommendations listed here cannot necessarily be generalised to all camps. In addition, please refer to section 11 for general recommendations for all stakeholders.

- 1) Encourage resettlement countries, UNHCR, and IOM to undertake consultations with CBOs and CCs on areas of interest and concern;
- 2) Promote consultations between NGOs, CBOs, and CCs regarding the provision of accurate information on resettlement countries and about the timing of resettlement;
- 3) Encourage the provision of financial support to NGOs and CBOs so that they can manage the impacts of resettlement on their programs;
- 4) Encourage more predictable timing in resettlement – such as a minimum 3 month period after departure notification to prepare handovers and replacement staff;
- 5) Continue to support and build the capacity of CCs and CBOs that play a large role in the camps, particularly given the fact that CBOs may lose their most experienced staff and proposal writers;

## **8. OTHER RESETTLEMENT-AFFECTED GROUPS**

In addition to having impacts in the health, education, and camp administration sectors of the camps, the issue of resettlement also arises for specific groups of camp individuals. In particular, extremely vulnerable individuals (EVIs) and separated children (SC) are at risk.

### **8.1 Extremely Vulnerable Individuals (EVIs)**

EVIs include medically, physically, emotionally, or mentally vulnerable individuals who require extra care. They also include single mothers and the elderly. Some require greater resources than the rest of the camp population, and are hence considered good candidates for resettlement, where third countries can presumably offer them the services they require. If the skilled are resettling in higher proportions than the rest of the population, then it might be considered prudent to resettle EVIs at higher rates as well, to ensure that they are sufficiently cared for. The salience of this logic becomes clear when one considers the fact that in Mae La, all of HI's physical therapists have applied for resettlement.

On the one hand, EVIs may be less likely to resettle without extra assistance from UNHCR, NGOs, and CBOs. For the same reasons that the skilled and educated are among the first to apply, EVIs in general have the least access to information about resettlement and it can be burdensome for them to apply. For a physically disabled individual, for example, showing up for two or three UNHCR interviews and between one to three resettlement country interviews at a central location is no easy task.

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<sup>49</sup> Confidential interview, CC executive committee member. Mae La, April 2007.

On the other hand, lack of access to the resettlement process is only one aspect of EVI decisions about resettlement. EVIs may have legitimate reasons for being reluctant to apply. At Care Villa in Mae La, for example, residents expressed deep and carefully considered reservations about resettlement, despite the personal visit of a UNHCR representative. Of the 60 residents – who are blind or otherwise physically disabled – none have departed for resettlement and 7 are considering it. They expressed a desire to be resettled as a group, so that they can continue to live together as they have been. One individual with a wife and two children expressed his ambiguity as follows: ‘I want my children to have a better education, but life would be very hard for me. My children would be at school and my wife would go to work. I would be alone all day.’<sup>50</sup>

Related to categories of vulnerability for resettlement prioritization are protection cases, those individuals and/or families whose need for protection makes them candidates for immediate resettlement. UNHCR has been working with NGOs and CBOs to locate serious protection cases, and referrals of such cases have included disabled children (referred by WE/C); medical cases (from a variety of camp sources) and vulnerable women (referred primarily by KWO and SGBV Committees). However, individuals whose particular vulnerability would lead UNHCR to advance or prioritize cases are only one small category within a larger population identified as EVI. UNHCR records medical and other conditions that would identify vulnerabilities quite generally, but as one UNHCR representative noted, information about protection as it is currently collected during registration has no room for degrees of vulnerability.<sup>51</sup>

## **8.2 Separated Children**

Separated children include any individuals under the age of 18 who do not reside with their mother and/or father in the camps. The majority live with other relatives, such as aunts or uncles, and a large proportion also live in dorms, or boarding houses, in the camps. A smaller number lives with foster families.<sup>52</sup>

Separated children are at potential risk for vulnerability during the resettlement process because they rarely are permitted to resettle without the permission of their mother and father. Thus, while their foster families or distant relatives resettle, they may have to remain in the camps.<sup>53</sup> One NGO has reported the increased possibility of depression and anxiety for such children, even at a higher rate than in the regular population, because they are that much more susceptible to vulnerability.<sup>54</sup>

## **9. POSITIVE IMPACTS**

The prospect of resettlement has brought a sense of renewed hope for many in the camps who are interested in taking the opportunity to move to a third country and rebuild

<sup>50</sup> Care Villa resident. Mae La camp, 25 April 2007.

<sup>51</sup> Elizabeth Kirton, Head of Field Office, UNHCR. Mae Sot, 24 April 2007. She commented ‘Even people with high blood pressure have been marked as vulnerable -- particularly as the registration information is provided by the refugees themselves – so we can’t use that to determine protection cases.’

<sup>52</sup> In Tak province, for example, 2600 separated children live with relatives, 1,062 live in dorms, and 173 live with foster families. Information provided by Chumpol Maniratanavongsiri, COERR employee. Mae Sot, 24 April 2007.

<sup>53</sup> Those in boarding houses are reliant upon dorm supervisors and members of the camp committee’s social welfare committee for their care, but by all accounts, replacements for these positions have not thus far been a problem.

<sup>54</sup> IRC internal document.

their lives and obtain rights and citizenship there. There is an energy and sense of anticipation and excitement, especially for those who have been accepted for resettlement. At this early stage, however, few specific positive impacts were reported for the remaining population. There are two exceptions.

First, remittances have already begun to flow to families and CBOs remaining in the camps. For example, donations from resettled camp residents from Mae Ra Ma Luang helped to pay for a celebration for Karen New Year in the camp.<sup>55</sup> Second, when long-serving individuals vacate key positions, it can, in some instances, offer the opportunity for new leaders to emerge.

## 10. FINANCIAL COSTS OF RESETTLEMENT

If resettlement leads to a decrease in the camp population, then one might assume that the overall costs for running the camps will decrease as well. In the long term, if camp populations do decrease, overall costs may be reduced, as the total need for food rations, camp worker subsidies, and household supplies decreases. In the short and intermediate term, however, the financial costs for running the nine camps on the border will increase as NGOs and CBOs continue to strive to provide quality services to camp residents. These costs include, but are not limited to:

- Replacement trainings
- Stipends for apprentices
- Additional expatriate/national staff
- Increased need for outsourcing (hospital referrals, professional interpreters, etc.)

Identifying financial costs specifically associated with resettlement for all nine camps proved difficult. First, some NGOs have folded new responses into existing programs, making it difficult to isolate resettlement costs. Second, elements such as transportation, expatriate salaries, and (re)building community structures are designated not only for resettlement responses, but for new initiatives as well. A small sample (found in Appendix E) of the kinds of costs associated with resettlement, however, yields a figure of more than 12 million baht for annual costs.

## 11. RECOMMENDATIONS TO KEY STAKEHOLDERS

These recommendations attempt to balance the more concerning aspects of the impact of resettlement — given the expeditious depletion of skilled and experienced staff from education and health sectors in particular — with constructive and positive recommendations and strategies. They reflect suggestions and strategies identified by a large range of stakeholders throughout the consultation to mitigate the negative impacts of resettlement on camp services to the remaining camp population.

### 11.1 NGOs and CBOs

1. Continue trainings and shadowing for new replacements in camp-based programs.

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<sup>55</sup> Mae Ra Ma Luang CC meeting. Mae Ra Ma Luang, 18 April 2007.

- In addition to stop-gap measures necessary to maintain the functioning of programs, boost long-term capacity within the sectors of education, health, and camp administration.
  - In order to frontload experience, pursue 'shadowing' with a pool of available individuals.
  - Continue to work with RTG to pursue greater work and travel flexibility for NGO workers. (See RTG recommendations).
2. Prioritise resources (both financial and labour) in key parts of education and health sectors to address resettlement's impact:
    - Where financial resources are limited, devote significant funding to training replacement workers in the health and education sectors. In particular, focus on ensuring that the following programs are not neglected:
      - Post-10 education
      - Teacher preparation courses
      - Medic trainings
      - RCH trainings
    - Where possible, devote resources intended for resettling refugees to be available to the remaining population as well.
      - For example, promote VT and English programs that are relevant for the remaining population.
    - Be aware of differential stipends among camp positions, and of the possibility that camp-based workers may leave positions where they are needed in order to obtain a higher stipend.
  3. As one way of addressing the loss of camp-based institutional knowledge, encourage longer-term contracts for expatriate and national staff to ensure continuity in the system.
  4. Pursue initiatives and programs that would allow NGOs and CBOs to draw on the resources of the resettled population:
    - Where needed and possible, utilise members of resettled population as translators (for curriculum translation, for example).
    - Develop a database of resettled refugees with specific skills and/or strong connections to the camp in order to ensure best use of the experienced and skilled resettled population, particularly in light of the fact that many want to remain involved.
    - As an intermediate/long-term option, encourage the possibility of a return system in which resettled refugees can return to work in the camp community (see Resettlement Country recommendations).
  5. Continue to advocate for a more predictable resettlement process. (See UNHCR recommendations).
  6. To respond to the need for open communication with camp-based workers, encourage individual staff to 1) make decisions about resettlement based on their best interests; and 2) advise their employers of where they are in the

resettlement process (applied/been submitted/been accepted/had medical check, etc.).<sup>56</sup>

7. Identify EVIs who are truly interested in resettlement, and for whom it would be a good option, and work with UNHCR to assist them in the resettlement process.
8. In order to respond to the widespread interest in the findings of this report, consider distributing an edited summary of the report to interested stakeholders such as RTG officials and *palats*.
9. Strengthen responses to current leakage of skilled staff, including incentives for remaining staff in NGOs and CBOs. For example:
  - To boost morale of camp-based workers, develop and implement simple strategies to support staff, such as additional supplies, clothing with logos, free lunches, private social space, etc.
  - Write letters of recommendation for staff, both for those who are remaining and those who are departing. For departing staff members, this may encourage them to continue working with enthusiasm while they remain. For those remaining, letters of recommendation may help them to feel valuable and appreciated.

## **11.2 UNHCR, IOM, OPE**

### **UNHCR**

1. In coordination with resettlement countries, provide as much information as possible on the timing of the resettlement process.
  - Distribute a basic information sheet that describes the approximate duration of each stage of the resettlement process.
  - Inasmuch as is possible, inform refugees where they are in the resettlement process so that they may inform their employers accordingly.<sup>57</sup>
  - Develop a systematic process of consultation with NGOs and CBOs on the resettlement process specifically, to update agencies on when individuals will depart.<sup>58</sup> This could take the form of:
    - Monthly meetings, perhaps added to the Monthly Coordination Meeting.
    - Written updates, translated into the appropriate languages.
2. Provide more information on the conditions in resettlement countries. CCs and CBOs expressed a view that camp residents applying for resettlement need more

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<sup>56</sup> This would be supported by resettlement countries and UNHCR strengthening information flows on the timing of resettlement. See following recommendations.

<sup>57</sup> For some stages, UNHCR is quick to inform refugees where they are in the process – for example, refugees know almost immediately when they have been accepted by the resettlement country. But between the time a refugee expresses an interest in resettlement and the time he/she is granted an interview with a resettlement country, there is relatively little information, and this process can take from three months to two years. Providing information to refugees about these stages of the resettlement process could also help to ease some of the tension surrounding resettlement issues.

<sup>58</sup> UNHCR's 'Profile of the Myanmar Refugee Population in Thailand: Assessment of the Potential Impact of Resettlement on Community Structures in Camps' (March 2007) suggests that NGOs share with UNHCR the identities of all their camp-based employees, so that UNHCR can track who is leaving, and when. While this strategy may work on a case-by-case basis, it is not advisable for all situations. First, because information about camp-based workers changes so rapidly, even a monthly report would be out of date by the time it was processed. Second, some refugees fear that the information would be used by UNHCR to postpone the resettlement of camp-based workers. The inaccuracy of this belief notwithstanding, many NGOs are reluctant to provide UNHCR with such lists because they want to ensure trusting relationships with their camp-based staff.

information before they apply so as to make more fully informed decisions. In coordination with resettlement countries, provide more balanced and accurate information about resettlement countries (social security provisions, climate, politics, social environment, challenges for new refugees settling, etc.) so that applicants have as much information as possible to inform their decisions to resettle.

3. Continue to carefully monitor the impact of resettlement missions on the functioning of camp services and camp activities, and take into consideration the feedback of CBOs and NGOs in this regard.
4. Ensure that the CCSDPT/UNHCR Comprehensive Plan includes specific proposals to address the impact of resettlement of skilled and educated staff needed to run the camps.

#### *IOM*

1. Given that training and handover time is often critical to support the induction of replacements, reconsider the advisability of building a reception centre (still in the planning stages) that would remove resettling refugees from the camp three months prior to their departure.
2. Continue to allow physical spaces devoted to resettlement to be used for the remaining population (when not being used for resettlement purposes).

#### *UNHCR, IOM, OPE*

1. Continue to be aware that human resources are the most limited of all, and draw from the camp labour supply with an awareness of how much it may affect different sectors.

### **11.3 Resettlement Countries**

1. Respond to the need for more information and a more predictable departure system.
  - Coordinate with one another and consult with NGOs and CBOs about the timing of the resettlement process. There is a preference in the camp community (NGOs, CBOs, and camp committees) to time the resettlement process such that it minimises disruptions to NGO programs.<sup>59</sup>
  - Because all parties rely on resettlement countries for much of the information about the timing of the resettlement process, improve communication with UNHCR, NGOs, CBOs, and CCs about the timing of: resettlement missions; the application and acceptance process; and resettlement departures.
2. Consider a system whereby resettled refugees could return to work in the camps (as expatriate workers) in a relatively short time period.

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<sup>59</sup> For example, there is a strong preference to not disrupt teachers and students mid-semester, but instead to wait for the end of the term.

#### **11.4 Royal Thai Government**

1. Expedite the permission of NGO and CBO workers to work in and travel between the camps.
  - Provide permission to NGOs and CBOs to relocate skilled refugee workers between camps, where program shortages could be filled by receiving available qualified workers from other camps.
  - Continue to provide permission for refugees to attend centralised (short- and long-term) trainings in towns and other camps.
  - Where necessary, permit expatriate and national staff to provide more direct service delivery in the camps.
  - Minimise the administrative burden for obtaining work and travel permits.
2. Continue to move forward expeditiously with formal legal approval for education and livelihood programs outside camps, to expand opportunities for the remaining population.
  - Permit camp residents to work legally outside the camps.
  - Continue to improve access to the Thai education system for camp students.

#### **11.5 Donors**

1. Contribute to improving resources for the remaining population by supporting initiatives that address the impact of resettlement and maintain existing services in the camps.
2. With the recognition that, especially in the short term, resettlement will cost more for the remaining population (rather than less), support training and capacity building programs and initiatives for inexperienced and new staff in the camps.
3. Recognise that new funding initiatives can affect the remaining population. Even if the financial resources come from a separate funding stream that is earmarked for one program, the limited pool of labour in the camps means that new programs can take staff away from existing programs.

#### **11.6 All Stakeholders**

1. Continue to advocate for other local durable solutions,<sup>60</sup> in particular to work toward positive developments that strengthen refugee self-reliance by improving the ability of refugees to pursue education and livelihood opportunities both within and outside the camps.
2. Given the source of refugee movement into Thailand, continue to work with the international community to advocate for change in Burma and address the underlying root causes of protracted conflict there.

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<sup>60</sup> This is in accordance with the 2005 UNHCR ExCom Conclusion on Local Integration. This Conclusion affirms 'the value of strengthening capacities in host countries as well as of enhancing the ability of refugee communities to become self-reliant...' and recognises 'that promoting the self-reliance of refugees from the outset will contribute towards their protection and dignity, help refugees manage their time spent in exile effectively and constructively, decrease dependency and enhance the sustainability of any future durable solution.' UNHCR ExCom Conclusion on Local Integration, No. 104 (LVI), 7 October 2005.

## 12. APPENDICES

### Appendix A: Resettlement Activity vs. Education Level<sup>61</sup>

UNHCR possesses data on the “resettlement activity” (expressed interest, submitted, accepted, and departed) of each registered camp resident. A comparison of resettlement activity within each education level demonstrates that those with higher education levels are more likely to express interest, be submitted, be accepted, and depart for resettlement than those with no education.

#### *Notes on Resettlement Activity categories*

Expressed Interest: In theory, all expressions of interest in resettlement (whether communicated via letter or in person) should be entered into UNHCR’s database by UNHCR field officers. In practice, however, it has been difficult for UNHCR to capture all expressions of interest. First, the labour-intensive process means that mass registration has only begun in one camp (Mae La) where it is not yet completed. Second, in other camps, UNHCR has undertaken *ad hoc* registration of interest exercises prior to selection missions, but these were in no way inclusive of all who may have been interested in applying, and were limited only to specific countries of submission. Standard policy notwithstanding, there is variety in practice: in some (the camps in Mae Hong Son province), expressions of interest are only recorded once specific resettlement countries announce their upcoming selection missions, while in others (Mae La), UNHCR is making attempts to contact each household directly to ascertain resettlement interest. In Tham Hin, it was originally assumed that the entire camp would be resettled, and thus 100% of the Tham Hin population is under the ‘Expressed Interest’ category.<sup>62</sup> These variations indicate that the expressed interest category, while valuable as comparative tool within one camp, can neither be used comparatively across camps nor can it be considered a wholly accurate picture of resettlement interest. This category also does not take into consideration that refugees’ decisions about resettlement may change over time, as they receive news of the experiences of their friends, family, and colleagues who have already resettled.

Submitted: UNHCR submits refugee dossiers (also known as RRFs, refugee referral forms) to one resettlement country at a time. As the percentages below demonstrate, an expression of interest does not necessarily guarantee submission. While nearly 38% of all registered camp residents are marked as having expressed an interest in resettlement, only 27% have had their RRFs submitted to resettlement countries. There are several reasons for this. First, there are fewer resettlement slots in a given year than there are individuals interested. Second, UNHCR considers several factors (protection cases, date of arrival in Thailand, family reunification, family size, ethnicity and

<sup>61</sup> Note on data classification: the education categories utilised in this study are grouped differently from UNHCR’s groupings. For example, UNHCR classifies “secondary school” as standards 10, 11, and 12, but based on categories that most interviewees used themselves, this study groups together standards 8 to 10 as one category and post-10 as another category.

<sup>62</sup> In fact, Tham Hin exhibits an expressed interest level of over 100% because 1) the entire camp was originally ‘screened-in’; and 2) since then, those interested in resettlement have expressed their interest more than once and/or to more than one country. Henceforth, UNHCR’s agreement with resettlement countries will dictate that UNHCR must conduct a verification of interest before submission.

language, special needs, etc.) in determining whom to submit first, if at all. UNHCR's criteria and process for submitting refugees to resettlement countries is presented in their guidelines, in Appendix B.

Note: There is no category for 'applied,' but this is often the word refugees use to describe where they are in the process. They also use the term 'in the pipeline.' Refugees who say that they have applied or are 'in the pipeline' are likely in one of the first two categories.

Accepted: Once resettlement countries receive the RRFs for refugees, the countries' representatives decide who will be accepted or not. Neither UNHCR nor the RTG is part of this process (although several *palats* have expressed an interest in being consulted while resettlement countries make their decisions.) Acceptance rates vary greatly between countries.<sup>63</sup>

Departed: Once refugees have departed for resettlement, UNHCR notes this information as well. Information between IOM and UNHCR varies slightly because IOM counts the number of departures according to the transportation documents it prepares, which also includes people who resettle who are not formally recognised as refugees.

The tables below utilise UNHCR's raw data to display the percentages of camp residents in each education category who are at various stages of the resettlement process. Table A.1 shows that, across all camps, 61.2% of the entire post-10 camp population has expressed an interest in resettlement, while only 27.7% of those with no education have done so. Likewise, 19.6% of all post-10 camp residents have been accepted for resettlement, while only 4.4% of the uneducated have been accepted. Similar patterns exhibit through all education levels: as education levels increase, resettlement activity increases in all categories.<sup>64</sup>

Table A.1: Education Level vs. Resettlement Activity, Total Population, All Camps

| Resettlement Activity | No Education | K-4 (incl. informal) | Std 5-7 | Std 8-10 | Post-10 (incl. VT) | Total |
|-----------------------|--------------|----------------------|---------|----------|--------------------|-------|
| Expressed Interest    | 27.7%        | 40.4%                | 47.2%   | 57.6%    | 61.2%              | 37.7% |
| Submitted             | 20.4%        | 29.9%                | 34.1%   | 42.6%    | 47.8%              | 27.9% |
| Accepted              | 4.4%         | 7.7%                 | 11.2%   | 17.0%    | 19.6%              | 7.7%  |
| Departed              | 2.4%         | 4.3%                 | 6.0%    | 8.8%     | 11.5%              | 4.2%  |

Source: Percentages based on raw data from UNHCR May 2007

Table A.2 demonstrates this same phenomenon, but instead analyzes only the adult portion of the camp population, an exercise geared more specifically toward understanding the resettlement activity of the population with the potential to work. The results are similar. Of all post-10 camp residents over 18, over 60% have expressed an interest in resettlement, while only 24% of the uneducated adult population has. And

<sup>63</sup> UNHCR is currently conducting a comparative study of different countries' resettlement rates. It has not yet been released, but preliminary results reveal that countries concerned about "integration potential" tend to reject more refugees proportionally than other countries. Canada, for example, has an acceptance rate of 99.4%, while Norway's is 65.2% (Email correspondence with Jeffrey Savage, Resettlement Officer, UNHCR. May 22, 2007.)

<sup>64</sup> Note on percentage calculation: the percentages presented for the expressed interest, submitted, and accepted categories are all based on the population of current registered camp residents. Calculating the percentage of departed, however, was accomplished by dividing the total number who have departed from 2005-2007 by the total camp population in May 2007.

while almost 20% of the post-10 adult population has been accepted for resettlement, only 2.8% of the uneducated adult population has.

**Table A.2: Education Level vs. Resettlement Activity, Adult Population, All Camps**

| Resettlement Activity | No Education | K-4 (incl. informal) | Std 5-7 | Std 8-10 | Post-10 (incl. VT) | Total |
|-----------------------|--------------|----------------------|---------|----------|--------------------|-------|
| Expressed Interest    | <b>24.3%</b> | 44.7%                | 47.0%   | 57.0%    | <b>60.7%</b>       | 38.5% |
| Submitted             | <b>17.0%</b> | 33.6%                | 33.7%   | 41.9%    | <b>47.4%</b>       | 28.0% |
| Accepted              | <b>2.8%</b>  | 7.8%                 | 10.9%   | 16.7%    | <b>19.6%</b>       | 7.8%  |
| Departed              | <b>1.3%</b>  | 4.6%                 | 6.0%    | 8.8%     | <b>11.6%</b>       | 4.2%  |

Source: Percentages based on raw data from UNHCR May 2007

The patterns exhibited in the tables above repeat themselves in each individual camp, although to different degrees. For example, Nu Po has experienced the least differences among education levels in resettlement activity, while the camps in Mae Hong Son have been the most affected. Table A.3 shows that in Nu Po, the submission and acceptance rates for the uneducated and post-10 population are relatively similar, while in Ban Mae Surin and Ban Nai Soi, the differences between education categories are vast.

**Table A.3: Cross-camp comparison: selected resettlement activities for uneducated, post-10, and total populations**

| Camp                   | Resettlement Activity | No Education | Post-10 (incl. VT) | Total     |
|------------------------|-----------------------|--------------|--------------------|-----------|
| Tham Hin <sup>65</sup> | Submitted             | 117%         | 202%               | 132%      |
|                        | Accepted              | 39%          | 105%               | 46%       |
| Mae La                 | Submitted             | 32%          | 76%                | 43%       |
|                        | Accepted              | 1%           | 13%                | 3%        |
| Umpiem Mai             | Submitted             | 3%           | 16%                | 5%        |
|                        | Accepted              | 2%           | 11%                | 3%        |
| <b>Nu Po</b>           | <b>Submitted</b>      | <b>5%</b>    | <b>9%</b>          | <b>8%</b> |
|                        | <b>Accepted</b>       | <b>3%</b>    | <b>5%</b>          | <b>5%</b> |
| <b>Ban Mae Surin</b>   | <b>Submitted</b>      | <b>3%</b>    | <b>38%</b>         | <b>8%</b> |
|                        | <b>Accepted</b>       | <b>0%</b>    | <b>21%</b>         | <b>1%</b> |
| <b>Ban Nai Soi</b>     | <b>Submitted</b>      | <b>5%</b>    | <b>51%</b>         | <b>7%</b> |
|                        | <b>Accepted</b>       | <b>3%</b>    | <b>37%</b>         | <b>4%</b> |
| Mae Ra Ma Luang        | Submitted             | 7%           | 43%                | 13%       |
|                        | Accepted              | 6%           | 41%                | 12%       |
| Mae La Oon             | Submitted             | 8%           | 55%                | 16%       |
|                        | Accepted              | 7%           | 51%                | 15%       |
| Ban Don Yang           | Submitted             | 12%          | 42%                | 21%       |
|                        | Accepted              | 5%           | 42%                | 11%       |

Source: Percentages based on raw data from UNHCR May 2007

<sup>65</sup> See footnote 62.

## Appendix B: Guidelines and Procedures for the Identification of Myanmar

### Refugees for Resettlement Submission

*Note: The Guidelines below have been modified in order to minimize the pages of this report. First, the text is presented in a smaller font than in the original, and second, appendices and footnotes have been deleted. A complete copy of these guidelines, with appendices and annexes, can be obtained from UNHCR.*

#### Guidelines and Procedures for the Identification of Myanmar Refugees for Resettlement Submission

##### Overview

The resettlement program for Myanmar refugees in the nine camps in Thailand, initiated in mid-2005, has thus far resulted in the referral of more than 16,000 refugees for resettlement consideration, and there are indications that the program will expand considerably in 2007 and subsequent years. UNHCR is highly encouraged by the increasing interest in resettlement as a durable solution for the Myanmar population in Thailand, considering the protracted nature of the situation and the visible effects of prolonged encampment on the refugee population.

Because UNHCR was caught rather off-guard at the beginning of the program – with the unexpected opening on the part of the Royal Thai Government (RTG) to the idea of large-scale resettlement from the camps – and as a result of the frantic pace at which resettlement has been undertaken since that time, the process of identifying cases for submission has thus far been carried out in a relatively ad hoc and somewhat inconsistent manner, focusing mainly on a first-come-first-served approach. This has raised legitimate questions among the refugee community, resettlement States, the RTG, and NGO and CBO partners as to how UNHCR determines which cases are submitted for resettlement consideration, and concerns about fairness and transparency have emerged.

Accordingly, UNHCR has developed the following guidelines and procedures for the identification of refugees for resettlement submission. It is hoped that these guidelines will be effective in allowing UNHCR to use this important durable solution as effectively and fairly as possible, particularly in view of the limited resettlement places available and the growing number of refugees who have expressed an interest in seeking a more permanent solution in third countries. It is hoped that these guidelines will ensure a more equitable process of identification and facilitate a process that is less subjective and easier to justify, both internally and among external partners.

These guidelines take into account the need to ensure that serious protection cases are identified for resettlement submission, both through UNHCR's own protection monitoring activities and through referrals by NGO and CBO partners working in the camps, while maintaining a viable mechanism to facilitate durable solutions in a strategic manner.

In an effort to create a more structured approach to the identification of refugees for referral, this document sets out comprehensive and systematic guidelines and procedures for submission. The document is organized in the following sections:

- General Priorities for Submission
- Identification of Protection Cases
- Identification of Durable Solutions Cases
- Strengthening Partnerships with NGOs and CBOs

A series of special forms have been designed to assist staff in the implementation of these guidelines and procedures, and these are annexed to this document. Additionally, a number of reports have been designed in the *proGres* database to assist in the identification process and to make the work of resettlement staff easier and more efficient.

In view of the continually changing nature of the refugee situation in Thailand, these guidelines should be viewed as a 'living document', and as such are subject to revision at a later stage should changes be necessitated by circumstances, or in the event alternative guidelines are developed following initial implementation.

#### General Priorities for Submission

In view of the complex refugee environment in the camps in Thailand – with a protracted situation of prolonged encampment combined with a growing number of refugees with serious protection concerns – resettlement activities must be managed in a fair and equitable manner in order to ensure that resettlement is used both as a tool of protection and as a means to provide durable solutions within the context of 'warehousing'.

When identifying cases for submission, either on an individual basis or as part of the process of preparing for selection missions, cases that meet standard protection criteria would be given first priority. Such cases would include individuals with security concerns, refugees with serious medical or psychological conditions, women-at-risk, separated or unaccompanied children, survivors of violence and torture, and refugees in need of family reunification with immediate relatives in third countries.

Cases seeking resettlement as a durable solution would be identified for submission as a second priority, with cases to be referred generally in the order in which the individuals arrived in Thailand. Given the large number of refugees in the nine camps wishing to seek resettlement and the limited places made available by resettlement States, and in view of the commonality of refugee claims among the population and the absence of other viable means of prioritization, the only way to ensure fairness in the process is to base identification on the date of arrival in Thailand.

Each of the two general priorities for identification is described in detail in the following sections.

#### Identification of Protection Cases

As noted above, cases falling into standard protection criteria should be considered for inclusion in resettlement submissions on a priority basis. The following section describes the primary categories of protection cases, and provides descriptions of the modalities that should be used for the identification of potential cases for referral.

**Security Cases** – In general, this category would include cases in which a refugee has established the existence of a serious threat to his or her physical safety in Thailand, and where the security situation in the camps is insufficient to provide adequate protection. In the camps, there may be individual refugees whose physical safety is under threat by the KNU, the KNPP, or other groups active inside and outside Thailand. In the case of a serious threat which would make it impossible for a person or group to reside in a particular camp, transfer to another camp should first be considered, if appropriate, at least for a temporary period while urgent resettlement is sought. It may be necessary for camp cases referred for resettlement based on security concerns to be reviewed in consultation with the RTG, at both the camp and district levels, as well as in Bangkok, in order to ensure protection while resettlement processing is underway.

**Modalities for Identification:** Resettlement cases in this category would be identified by staff in Bangkok and the field as part of the standard protection function of this Office. As refugees generally report such problems directly to UNHCR, NGOs, or CBOs, mechanisms are already in place to identify this type of case for submission. Publicity regarding this category should necessarily be limited in order to avoid bogus claims or 'self-induced threats'.

**Medical Cases** – Individuals who would qualify for resettlement submission under this category would be those who are afflicted with a very serious medical or psychological condition for which appropriate treatment is not available in the camps. As the standard of medical treatment in Thailand is quite high, for most conditions treatment would be possible in the country of asylum; however, the services required for treatment of many conditions are not available in the areas where camps are situated, and the RTG will generally not authorize camp residents to reside in urban areas. Along these same lines, life in a camp may not be compatible with necessary follow-up treatment for certain illnesses, and the poor conditions in camp may aggravate certain medical or psychological conditions or inhibit recovery. In such cases, resettlement may be the only means to ensure an individual receives necessary treatment. For all cases to be submitted for resettlement on medical or psychological grounds, a written assessment of the refugee's condition would be required from a qualified physician, describing the condition, the treatment required, and the prognosis for recovery with appropriate treatment.

**Modalities for Identification:** Resettlement candidates in this category would be identified by staff in Bangkok and the field through contacts with NGOs and CBOs working in the camps. Staff in the field should approach medical NGOs at the local level to provide information on UNHCR resettlement guidelines with regard to medical cases, and to solicit referrals in the event medical personnel believe an individual patient would benefit medically from resettlement.

Additionally, a report has been designed in *proGres* that would generate a list of cases that have expressed an interest in resettlement in which one or more members of the family have been recorded as having a serious medical or psychological condition.

**Women-at-Risk Cases** – This category would generally include single women headed households (or those in which adult male members of the family are unable to assume the role of head of household), victims of sexual and gender-based violence, including victims of domestic violence, or other women who for various reasons are considered exceptionally vulnerable in the camp setting. Such cases should only be submitted if resettlement abroad is clearly preferable to care and counselling arrangements within the refugee's own community, or if there is a clear, individual risk of further violations. In certain cases identified under this category, individual medical and/or psychological assessments, specifying why resettlement would be the most appropriate solution under specific individual circumstances, may be necessary. Further, particularly in cases involving domestic violence where minor children are present, best interests determinations may be necessary to justify the separation of the children from one of their parents, unless an amicable custody arrangement is possible, in which case a duly signed custody agreement form would be required.

**Modalities for Identification:** Resettlement cases in this category would be identified by staff in Bangkok and the field through direct contact with refugees and NGO and CBO staff working in the camps. As above, NGOs and CBOs in the camps should be made aware of UNHCR criteria and procedures for referral.

Additionally, a report has been designed in *proGres* that would generate a list of cases that have expressed an interest in resettlement in which one or more members of the family have been identified as being a woman-at-risk.

**Cases Involving Separated or Unaccompanied Children** – This category would include unaccompanied or separated children where no acceptable care arrangements are or can be put in place in the camps. In view of the special circumstances of refugee children and the various problems which might arise from resettlement in a third country, such cases should be reviewed thoroughly in order to ensure that resettlement is preferable to care arrangements that could be put in place in Thailand. As a general rule, the resettlement of unaccompanied children alone should be considered only in exceptional cases, and only as a last resort. In all cases identified under this category, full best interests determinations, assessing each of the available options, including eventual reunification with close relatives in Myanmar or other locations in Thailand, would be required.

**Modalities for Identification:** Resettlement cases in this category would be identified by staff in Bangkok and the field through direct contact with refugees and NGO and CBO staff working in the camps. As above, NGOs and CBOs should be made aware of UNHCR criteria and procedures for referral.

Additionally, a report has been designed in *proGres* that would generate a list of cases that have expressed an interest in resettlement in which one or more members of the family have been recorded as being an unaccompanied or separated child.

**Survivors of Violence and Torture** – This category would include victims of serious violence and torture where the individuals are in need of ongoing medical or psychological care, counselling, or other types of special assistance that are not available in the camps. Refugees who suffered past violence or torture, but who have been able to adequately cope with those events and recover to lead a normal life, would not normally be identified for resettlement referral. In all cases identified under this category, individual medical and/or psychological assessments, specifying why resettlement would be the most appropriate solution under specific individual circumstances, would be useful.

**Modalities for Identification:** Resettlement cases in this category would be identified by staff in Bangkok and the field through direct contact with refugees and NGO and CBO staff working in the camps. As above, NGOs and CBOs should be made aware of UNHCR criteria and procedures for referral.

**Family Reunification Cases** – In order to qualify for resettlement submission under UNHCR family reunification criteria, a refugee must have an *immediate relative* residing in a country of resettlement; for purposes of UNHCR resettlement, immediate relatives include husbands and wives, minor children, dependent unmarried adult children, minor siblings, or other relatives who are determined to be economically and emotionally dependent (such as elderly parents).

**Modalities for Identification:** Resettlement cases in this category would be identified by staff in Bangkok and the field generally through direct contact from refugees or their relatives, NGOs, CBOs, or Embassies.

Additionally, a report has been designed in *proGres* that would generate a list of cases that have expressed an interest in resettlement in which immediate relatives have been identified in resettlement countries; the report would be able to generate lists according to each respective country of resettlement.

#### Identification of Durable Solutions Cases

As mentioned above, cases which do not present protection concerns according to standard resettlement criteria, but for whom resettlement could be used as a means to provide durable solutions in a protracted refugee situation, would be considered for submission as a second priority.

In order to ensure fairness in the identification process, the only basis on which to refer cases for durable solutions purposes would be the date of arrival in Thailand. It could be argued that a more appropriate basis would be the date of arrival in camp, but this would be problematic for the following reasons:

- The date of arrival in camp was not recorded during the recent re-registration exercise, while the date of arrival in Thailand was recorded on an individual basis; to attempt to collect the date of arrival in camp at this stage would most definitely result in false claims.

- The current nine camps in Thailand were created at different times, largely through the relocation of refugees who previously resided in other camps; thus, refugees who arrived directly from Myanmar to the camp where they now reside may be given priority over those who arrived later to the current camp, but who had resided in another camp before being relocated.
- Although many refugees may have lived in other areas of Thailand before being admitted to the camp where they now reside, in terms of the process of seeking asylum, the key point of reference should generally be the time at which the individual left the country of origin, rather than the point at which formal asylum was sought (i.e., admission to a camp).

Accordingly, the identification of cases for submission in this category would be handled on a 'first-in-first-out' basis, with the date of arrival in Thailand being the key point of reference.

In order to facilitate the process of identification, reports would be designed to generate from *proGres* lists of all refugees in a particular camp that have expressed an interest in resettlement, but who have not yet been submitted. This list would be ordered according to the claimed date of arrival in Thailand of the principal applicant of the household, and refugees would be called for pre-screening beginning with those cases with the earliest dates of arrival.

### **Strengthening Partnerships with NGOs and CBOs**

In order to ensure the resettlement process in Thailand is facilitated as effectively as possible, it is crucial that UNHCR staff in Bangkok and the three field offices make concerted efforts to strengthen and maintain partnerships with the NGOs and CBOs involved in providing services to the camp population.

As noted above, NGOs and CBOs – given their close connections with the refugees in the camps – are particularly important to the process of identifying refugees in need of resettlement for protection reasons or because of certain vulnerabilities. UNHCR staff in the field should encourage their counterparts to take an active and supportive role in the referral of potential resettlement cases to UNHCR. To facilitate their involvement, relevant NGOs and CBOs should be provided guidance on the overall resettlement process, and on the particular procedures and criteria for submission on medical, psychological, and vulnerability grounds. Close involvement with the Legal Aid Centres, which are soon to be established in a certain camps on a pilot basis, will be extremely important in the identification of urgent security cases for possible resettlement.

As with all persons involved in the resettlement process, NGOs and CBOs should be assured that any information provided to UNHCR would be kept strictly confidential, and would only be released to relevant external parties with the written consent of the refugees concerned.

NGO and CBO representatives should be encouraged to participate in resettlement information dissemination activities in the camps, and to offer their suggestions and comments on how the process is implemented by UNHCR.

In order to facilitate the process of receiving referrals from NGOs and CBOs, an *NGO/CBO Resettlement Referral Form* has been developed. This form should be completed by the referral source for each case that is referred, and should include details on the members of the household, the grounds and justification for referral, and the signature of the refugee concerned indicated his or her interest in being considered for resettlement in a third country.

## Appendix C: Camp-based workers, Education Level, and Projected Resettlement

In order to ascertain the impact of resettlement on the delivery of services in the camps, Appendix C examines 1) the profile of camp-based refugees who currently work in the camps; and 2) the profile of those who will depart. The tables below offer preliminary assessments for 2007 and 2008.

The first table presents data about the number of camp-based workers, by education level, required to run the camps as they function now. Information for this table was collected through extensive interviews with NGO town-based and camp-based staff and CBO staff and members. Project coordinators and CCSDPT health and education sub-committee members were also consulted. For this section of the research, interviewees were asked the number of camp-based staff needed in each position and the ideal and minimum education levels of each position. From this data, it was possible to estimate the number of camp-based staff at each education level needed to maintain current service delivery in the camps.

Table C.1, below, summarizes this information by sector for all camps. Thus, of approximately 7,000 camp-based workers, 911 require a post-10 education in all camps combined: 168 in camp management, 157 in health, 536 in education, and 49 from other groups (primarily in KRC and KnRC). Those jobs requiring a lower level of education can be filled by those with a higher education. For example, the 780 positions that require no education could be performed by those with more education. The converse, of course, is not true: the 911 positions that require a post-10 education cannot easily be filled by those with lower education levels.<sup>66</sup>

**Table C.1: Camp-based employees by sector and education level (All camps)**

| ALL CAMPS                   | No Education | K-4 (incl. informal) | Std 5-7      | Std 8-10     | Post-10 (incl. VT) | Total        |
|-----------------------------|--------------|----------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------------|--------------|
| Camp Management Subtotal    | 244          | 224                  | 483          | 637          | <b>168</b>         | 1,756        |
| Health Subtotal             | 395          | 261                  | 416          | 550          | <b>157</b>         | 1,779        |
| Education Subtotal          | 141          | 423                  | 1,415        | 886          | <b>536</b>         | 3,401        |
| Other Total                 | -            | -                    | -            | 23           | <b>49</b>          | 72           |
| <b>Total Camp Employees</b> | <b>780</b>   | <b>908</b>           | <b>2,315</b> | <b>2,095</b> | <b>911</b>         | <b>7,008</b> |

Source: Author interviews with NGO staff, worldwide

In addition, the camps require a total of 251 camp-based workers with technical proficiency in English:<sup>67</sup>

- Camp Administration sector 27

<sup>66</sup> In practice, however, members of NGO staff are revising their assessments of what education levels are required because the labour resources are simply not available. For example, one medical NGO staff member said that while they used to require an 8<sup>th</sup> standard level of education for their nurses, they are now accepting those with only 6<sup>th</sup> standard completed.

<sup>67</sup> As previously noted, data about current English speakers were difficult to collect, not least because of varying definitions of 'English speaker.' Thus, while this preliminary analysis does offer an estimate of the number of English-speaking staff required to run the camps, it does not take the next step and project how many are departing and how many will remain. This is an important area for future study.

- Health sector 184
- Education sector 24
- Other (refugee committees) 16

The information in Table C.1 can then be compared to UNHCR's camp population data to determine when problem situations will arise. (This information is offered on a camp-by-camp basis in Appendix D.)

Table C.2 is sourced from UNHCR data (May 2007) that summarizes the resettlement activity of refugees by education level. This table does not account for: 1) the unregistered population (see below explanation); and 2) the fact that in some camps, individuals who are registered as camp residents live and work outside of the camp. Thus, while it may appear from the data as though the total numbers in each education level are able to work in the camps, in reality, not all camp-based refugees are available for camp-based positions.

**Table C.2: Total camp population, by education level and resettlement activity (All camps)**

|                    | No Education | K-4 (incl. informal) | Std 5-7 | Std 8-10 | Post-10 (incl. VT) | Total   |
|--------------------|--------------|----------------------|---------|----------|--------------------|---------|
| Total Population   | 54,269       | 49,578               | 14,930  | 11,541   | 1,995              | 132,313 |
| Expressed Interest | 15,008       | 20,006               | 7,040   | 6,653    | 1,220              | 49,927  |
| Submitted          | 11,066       | 14,837               | 5,096   | 4,912    | 953                | 36,864  |
| Accepted           | 2,377        | 3,795                | 1,674   | 1,963    | 391                | 10,200  |
| Departed           | 1,283        | 2,126                | 896     | 1,010    | 230                | 5,545   |

Source: UNHCR May 2007

The information in these two tables can then be compared to projections of future camp populations for 2007 and 2008, which are found for the entire camp population in Table C.3. In this assessment, several assumptions had to be made about the number of individuals to be submitted and accepted from each camp and the timing of different countries' resettlement processes. These assumptions varied from camp to camp and were derived from interviews with resettlement country representatives, UNHCR international and national staff, OPE, and IOM.<sup>68</sup>

Based on these assumptions, Table C.3 estimates the camp population by education level at the end of 2007 and at the end of 2008. Totals are offered below, and Appendix D contains explanations for each camp separately.

<sup>68</sup> In this assessment, only one scenario was explored, although percentages varied among camps. For example, in Mae La, it was assumed that 90% of those already accepted would depart by the end of 2007, while in Mae Hong Son, it was assumed that only 85% of those accepted would depart by the end of 2007. This is because of differential administrative burdens in different provinces. See Appendix D for individual camp assessments. All data have been calculated on a spreadsheet, so that changing any of the assumed percentages, or generating a range of scenarios, will pose few problems for future assessments.

**Table C.3: Projected Resettlement for Total Population, for 2007 and 2008 (All camps)**

|  | No Education | K-4 (incl. informal) | Std 5-7 | Std 8-10 | Post-10 (incl. VT) | Total   |
|--|--------------|----------------------|---------|----------|--------------------|---------|
| Total Registered Camp Population, May 2007   | 54,269       | 49,578               | 14,930  | 11,541   | <b>1,995</b>       | 132,313 |
| Estimated Registered Population, end of 2007 | 50,769       | 45,108               | 12,961  | 9,274    | <b>1,233</b>       | 119,345 |
| Estimated Registered Population, end of 2008 | 40,236       | 32,888               | 9,125   | 5,592    | <b>488</b>         | 88,355  |

Source: Authors' analysis based on interviews and UNHCR data, May 2007

The projections above do not take into account a significant group of camp residents: the unregistered camp population. First, while it is clear that the unregistered are (increasingly) being hired as camp-based workers, data are unavailable on their education levels. Second, because of the unpredictable PAB process, it is difficult to estimate when many of these individuals will be permitted to begin the resettlement process. The projections also do not account for the student population in the camps (which totals 2,400 across all camps) because it is assumed that they are not available for work positions since they are studying full time.

A comparison of Tables C.1 and C.3 yield the following conclusions for the entire population of the refugee camps. (Note: this portion of the analysis only considers the quantity of post-10 graduates; it is not able to measure experience, leadership, or authority.

- The most serious impacts of resettlement will be on the post-10 population. At present, the ratio of post-10 residents to the total population is 1:66, but by the end of 2007 it will be 1:97 of the total population. By the end of 2008, with only 488 post-10 graduates in all nine camps, the ratio of post-10 residents to the total population will be 1:181.
- In six months' time, the post-10 population will have decreased by 38% across all camps, while the total population of the camps will only have decreased by 10%. In addition, although a decrease in the total population of the camp will mean that some camp-based positions will not be necessary, the need will not decrease in an exact ratio with the total population, thus heightening the problem of fewer skilled workers.
- By the end of 2008, there will be fewer post-10 residents in the camps than there are camp-based positions, and the number of post-10 workers will be insufficient to continue to offer services as they are offered now, unless more trainings are offered (see next bullet point).
- Because many of the positions in which post-10 graduates work require more than a year of training, and given the speed with which skilled members of the population will resettle, NGOs must begin training courses immediately in order to ensure replacement workers.

## Appendix D: Camp-Specific Data

Based on myriad interviews in all nine camps and on data found in Appendices A and C, a brief analysis of the resettlement situation in each camp is offered below. The analysis below focuses on a comparison of the total population to the post-10 population, because this is the group of camp residents who are departing at the highest and fastest rate, and their departure is easy to quantify. There are also skilled and experienced leaders in other education categories, of course. The post-10 analysis is offered as a means to reflect the patterns of skilled and educated individuals departing the camps for resettlement. It is not meant to suggest that only post-10 workers are valuable. Rather, this analysis offers a quantitative tool to depict the departure of significant portions of those who provide important benefits to the overall camp community.

***Projections about future camp populations are based on data collected at the time of the report's writing, and are highly subject to change.***

### Tham Hin

Tham Hin is in the most advanced stage of resettlement of all nine camps, with more than one-third of the registered camp population already departed. The decreasing number of medics and teachers is of grave concern to the remaining population. In order to continue providing the same level of health care as previously, the camp has been relying on medics among the unregistered population, who intend to apply for resettlement once they are recognized by the PAB. Schools, too, are using educated unregistered residents to serve as teachers. This is a temporary solution to address the problem of losing skilled workers, but for the time being, it is relatively effective, because few new residents have been accepted by the PAB.

Interviews revealed that a high proportion of remaining medics and teachers want to resettle. The camp committee did not discuss its intentions openly, but confidential sources expressed the belief that most members of the EC want to resettle as well. Many members of the camp – camp committee members, camp-based workers, and non-staff residents – expressed the fear that the camp might close in the near future. If the camp closes and its members have to be moved, several residents interviewed asserted that they would prefer to resettle. But if the camp remains where it is, some of the interviewed residents would like to do so as well.

Currently, out of a total population of more than 9,000, it is estimated that the camp requires **49** post-10 workers: 10 in administration, 7 in the health sector, 31 in the education sector, and 1 additional. There are currently **83** post-10 camp residents in Tham Hin, not including members of the unregistered population. By the end of 2007, it is estimated that only **24** post-10 residents will remain, out of a total population of 6,500. By the end of 2008, there will be **8** post-10 workers remaining, out of a total population of 5,500.<sup>69</sup>

Even taking into account a decrease in the camp population, Tham Hin will have a serious deficit of post-10 staff by the end of 2007, and an even graver deficit by the end

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<sup>69</sup> The following assumptions were made in calculating future projections for Tham Hin:

- 90% of those accepted will resettle in 2007 and 8% will resettle in 2008
- 90% of the post-10 population wants to / is able to resettle
- 120 additional residents will be accepted and will depart for resettlement in 2007
- 600 additional residents will be accepted and will depart for resettlement in 2008

of 2008. It seems likely that unregistered camp residents will have to continue to fill the gap during this time.

### Ban Nai Soi (Site 1)

Ban Nai Soi, which houses the vast majority of Karenni refugees, has witnessed relatively little resettlement activity – less than 2% of the camp population has departed for resettlement. However, the camp has been drastically affected by resettlement due to several factors. First, some of the selection missions that have come to Ban Nai Soi thus far have placed emphasis on integration potential. As a result, while only 1.76% of the total population has departed for resettlement and less than 1% of the uneducated population has departed, more than 20% of the post-10 population has departed for resettlement.<sup>70</sup> Second, while it is always the case that the literate population is better able to access information about resettlement, this is even more so in Ban Nai Soi, because UNHCR's resettlement information has been translated into the Burmese and Karen languages, but not into Karenni.

The departure of skilled staff in Ban Nai Soi is particularly difficult because such a small percentage of the camp population is literate to begin with. While 23% of adults across all camps are uneducated, the figure in Ban Nai Soi is 64%.<sup>71</sup> The unregistered population is generally uneducated as well, making it difficult to find additional skilled workers on whom to rely for medics and teachers.<sup>72</sup>

Difficulties in arranging selection missions for Ban Nai Soi may mean that the resettlement process slows, or comes to a halt, in this camp. While this would alleviate future resettlement concerns, this possibility is extremely worrisome to camp residents, particularly because any camp residents in the province with Thai identification are now required to choose between keeping their Thai identification cards and remaining in the camps. Those who choose to return to the camp with the idea of resettlement on the horizon will face grave disappointment if they give up their highly valuable Thai identification only to discover that they cannot pursue resettlement. (See, however, note following the Ban Mae Surin paragraphs).

Currently, out of a total registered population of about 18,000, it is estimated that the camp requires **97** post-10 workers: 12 in administration, 34 in the health sector, 46 in the education sector, and 5 additional. There are currently **98** post-10 camp residents in Ban Nai Soi, which clearly leaves very little room for more departures if the camp is to continue to function effectively. By the end of 2007, it is estimated that **58** post-10 residents will remain, out of a total population of 17,255. By the end of 2008, there will be **46** post-10 workers remaining, out of a total population of 17,160.<sup>73</sup>

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<sup>70</sup> The countries that have sent selection missions to Ban Nai Soi include: Norway, Finland, New Zealand, Australia, and the US. As already noted, an upcoming UNHCR report is expected to analyse which countries are more focused on integration potential than others.

<sup>71</sup> From UNHCR population data, May 2007.

<sup>72</sup> On the other hand, as noted in the text of the report, education levels in both Ban Nai Soi and Ban Mae Surin have improved vastly since the commencement of the Mae Hong Son camps.

<sup>73</sup> The following assumptions were made in calculating future projections for Ban Nai Soi:

- 85% of those accepted will resettle in 2007 and 10% will resettle in 2008
- 45 additional residents will be accepted and will depart for resettlement in 2007 (Australia)
- 45 additional residents will be accepted and will depart for resettlement in 2008 (Australia)
- Additional accepted residents will be divided evenly between education level (thus taking a greater proportion of the educated)

Clearly, the small numbers departing from Ban Nai Soi will continue to have a difficult and disproportionate effect on camp services. While the number of post-10 workers will halve by 2008, the total population is only expected to decrease by 4%.

#### Ban Mae Surin (Site 2)

Because of its remoteness, Ban Mae Surin is the camp least affected by resettlement to date. Only 2 individuals had departed for resettlement by May 2007, and an additional 18 had been accepted. Conversations with the camp committee revealed a tranquil attitude about the future. One resident noted that 'It's not in our culture to plan things in advance. We think about it when it happens.'<sup>74</sup>

Nevertheless, several camp residents were confused about the resettlement process. Some had been told that the best way to express their interest was to place letters in the UNHCR boxes located around the camp, but others were told that this was not sufficient to communicate interest. With the exception of the US (see following paragraph), selection missions have not placed great emphasis on traveling to Ban Mae Surin, and it seems that in the coming two years, few will resettle from there as a result.

*Note: the US plans to implement a group resettlement process in the second quarter of 2008 at both Ban Nai Soi and Ban Mae Surin. It is probable that departures of these individuals will not occur until 2009.*

#### Mae Ra Ma Luang and Mae La Oon

Both of the Mae Sariang camps have experienced small numbers of resettlement departures thus far – less than 5% each – but, as is the case with Ban Nai Soi, the percentage of educated residents who have expressed an interest and been submitted, accepted, and have departed is disproportionately high (see Table A.3, Appendix A).

As in Ban Nai Soi, teachers and medics are in high demand, with significant numbers of teachers and education administrators departing imminently. In anticipation of the departure of several educated medical staff, Maltheser International, the medical NGO in Mae Sariang, has implemented phased trainings whereby CHWs receive training to work as midwives, midwives receive training to work as nurses, and so on.

As in other camps, the mood in the camps has changed even though the number of resettled remains relatively small. One town-based NGO staff member noted that 'there is a change in attitude at all levels. Farmers are ignoring their vegetables. The camp staff just chatters at meetings and waits to leave. They talk about, how does Canada look, how can I survive there, is it cold?'<sup>75</sup>

Because Canada intends to continue its resettlement missions to the Mae Sariang camps, and, further because Canada's rate of acceptance (i.e., the percentage of refugees accepted out of the total submitted) is the highest of all resettlement countries (over 99%), resettlement from both Mae Ra Ma Luang and Mae La Oon will continue unabated, although the impacts may be less severe than in other camps.

In Mae Ra Ma Luang, out of a total registered population of more than 10,200, it is estimated that the camp requires **133** post-10 workers: 15 in administration, 12 in the health sector, 69 in the education sector, and 37 additional. There are currently **194**

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<sup>74</sup> Confidential interview, Ban Mae Surin camp committee member. Ban Mae Surin, 10 April 2007.

<sup>75</sup> Confidential interview, Mae Sariang-based NGO staff member. Mae Sariang, April 2007.

post-10 camp residents in Mae Ra Ma Luang, not including members of the unregistered population, who total nearly 5,000. By the end of 2007, it is estimated that **121** post-10 residents will remain, out of a total population of 9,100. By the end of 2008, there will be **97** post-10 workers remaining, out of a total population of 8,100.<sup>76</sup> Given their greater interest in resettlement, the educated population will resettle in higher proportions than the rest of the population, but, because of Canada's high acceptance rate across the board, not by as much as in some camps. In addition, a core group of Karen leaders who fled Manerplaw and have lived in Mae Ra Ma Luang ever since are not expected to resettle. These former soldiers and their families are not necessarily among the most educated members of the population, but they do provide continuity and leadership.

In Mae La Oon, out of a total registered population of more than 11,700, it is estimated that the camp requires **114** post-10 workers: 26 in administration, 11 in the health sector, and 77 in the education sector. There are currently **139** post-10 camp residents in Mae La Oon, not including members of the unregistered population, who total 2,400. By the end of 2007, it is estimated that **73** post-10 residents will remain, out of a total population of 10,200. By the end of 2008, there will be **57** post-10 workers remaining, out of a total population of 9,200.<sup>77</sup> The fact that the post-10 population will decrease by 60% while the total population will only decrease by 30% by 2008 indicates that in Mae La Oon, the problem of finding skilled workers is likely to be more serious than in Mae Ra Ma Luang.

*Note: the US plans to implement a group resettlement process in the final quarter of 2008 at both Mae Ra Ma Luang and Mae La Oon. Departures of these individuals will not occur until 2009.*

#### Tak Province: Mae La, Umpiem Mai, and Nu Po

Each of the camps in Tak Province is discussed individually below, but there are noteworthy commonalities that have the potential to influence resettlement and its impact in all three of the Tak camps. First, in recent months, the Tak governor has stated that there will be no new arrivals in the camps. Thus, according to UNHCR data, there are no unregistered residents in the Tak camps. In terms of projecting skilled and unskilled population levels and managing services for the remaining population, this could mean that the population decreases rather quickly without any replenishment. Second, selection missions from countries with smaller intakes (Norway, Denmark, New Zealand, and the UK) went to the Tak camps in 2006, and some of these countries are known to accept high percentages of educated camp residents and low percentages of the uneducated and unskilled. In 2007 and 2008, not all resettlement countries with smaller quotas will return to Tak, but some will; final numbers and dates have not yet been confirmed. Although the numbers of submissions are relatively small (less than 1,000 combined for New Zealand, UK, and Denmark, for example), the impact on the educated percentage of the population could be quite large if current acceptance rates

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<sup>76</sup> The following assumptions were made in calculating future projections for Mae Ra Ma Luang:

- 90% of those accepted will resettle in 2007 and 5% will resettle in 2008
- 30% of those already submitted (but not accepted) will leave in 2007, and 50% will leave in 2008
- 950 additional camp residents will be submitted, accepted, and will depart for resettlement to Canada in 2008, and they will be distributed among education levels proportionate to education levels as a percentage of the total population

<sup>77</sup> The following assumptions were made in calculating future projections for Mae La Oon:

- 90% of those accepted will resettle in 2007 and 5% will resettle in 2008
- 30% of those already submitted (but not accepted) will leave in 2007, and 50% will leave in 2008
- 850 additional camp residents will be submitted, accepted, and will depart for resettlement to Canada in 2008, and they will be distributed among education levels proportionate to education levels as a percentage of the total population

continue. The analysis below assumes that some smaller countries will continue to send selection missions to Tak province, but not as frequently as in the past.<sup>78</sup>

### Mae La

Mae La's size is both its strength and its weakness in terms of the issues that emerge because of resettlement. Several training programs and post-10 schools have allowed young educated refugees to study (and often remain after their studies are complete) in Mae La camp. The relatively large number of educated camp residents has meant that the camp has thus far been able to find suitable skilled and educated replacements for the departed. Only 2% of the population had departed for resettlement by May 2007, but this is soon to change. Mae La's size and proximity to Mae Sot have made it a convenient target for mass resettlement, and tens of thousands of refugees are expected to depart for resettlement from Mae La in 2007 and 2008.

In Mae La, out of a total registered population of about 46,000, it is estimated that the camp requires **239** post-10 workers: 53 in administration, 35 in the health sector, 146 in the education sector, and 5 additional. There are currently **726** post-10 camp residents in Mae La. By the end of 2007, it is estimated that **403** post-10 residents will remain, out of a total population of about 40,100. While a decrease in Mae La's post-10 population will certainly influence the running of the camp, the fact that there is currently a large surplus of post-10 workers means that there will still be enough post-10 workers to cover the needs of the camp in 2007. By the end of 2008, however, there will be **100** post-10 workers remaining, out of a total population of 28,000.<sup>79</sup> At this point, the post-10 population will have a difficult time providing adequate camp services.

### Umpiem Mai and Nu Po

Until now, resettlement from Umpiem Mai and Nu Po has been a relatively rare occurrence, with 2% and 4% of the camp population departing for resettlement, respectively. Thus far, NGO staff and camp-based workers have been able to plan relatively effectively for the departure of skilled staff, because the numbers have been small. As with Mae La, however, resettlement will gather momentum in the coming years. As of July 2007, UNHCR has begun to register new referrals in both camps with the intention of referring as many as 20,000 from both camps.

In Umpiem Mai, out of a total registered population of about 19,500, it is estimated that the camp requires **94** post-10 workers: 14 in administration, 16 in the health sector, and 64 in the education sector. There are currently **317** post-10 camp residents in Umpiem Mai. By the end of 2007, it is estimated that **199** post-10 residents will remain, out of a total population of about 18,500. By the end of 2008, there will be **77** post-10 workers remaining, out of a total population of 11,000.<sup>80</sup> If Umpiem Mai's educated population is

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<sup>78</sup> This assumption is based on the fact that UNHCR has recently instituted a policy whereby smaller selection missions will only be sent to camps where the US has already undertaken group resettlement. (Phone interview with Jeffrey Savage, UNHCR Resettlement Officer, July 2, 2007).

<sup>79</sup> The following assumptions were made in calculating future projections for Mae La:

- 90% of those accepted will resettle in 2007 and 5% will resettle in 2008
- Of those who have been submitted, but not yet accepted, 25% will depart by the end of 2007 and 65% will depart by the end of 2008
- There are 100 post-10 residents who do not intend to resettle in Mae La (Mae La has had the most extensive outreach by UNHCR, and despite this, 100 post-10 residents – and half of the entire population – have not expressed an interest in resettlement)
- Australia and the UK will continue to resettle small numbers (300) of refugees from Mae La.

<sup>80</sup> The following assumptions were made in calculating future projections for Umpiem Mai:

- 90% of those accepted will resettle in 2007 and 5% will resettle in 2008
- Australia and the UK will continue to resettle small numbers (430) of refugees annually from Umpiem Mai.
- The US will resettle 7,000 Umpiem Mai residents in 2008.

not moved to other camps to fill gaps in skill, this analysis shows that the camp will be less affected by resettlement than other camps in 2007. By 2008, however, both the post-10 population and the total population will have experienced a significant decrease, and any surfeit of educated workers from 2007 will have greatly diminished.

In Nu Po, out of a total registered population of about 13,300, it is estimated that the camp requires **104** post-10 workers: 20 in administration, 21 in the health sector, and 63 in the education sector. There are currently **439** post-10 camp residents in Nu Po. By the end of 2007, it is estimated that **333** post-10 residents will remain, out of a total population of about 12,300. By the end of 2008, there will be **87** post-10 workers remaining, out of a total population of 4,800.<sup>81</sup> Like Umpiem Mai, if the surfeit of workers in Nu Po actually resides in the camp, the educated portion of the population should be adequate to respond to a decrease in the current educated population in 2007, and if the camp population decreases as predicted in 2008, then the post-10 population will continue to be sufficient to participate in camp programs. This analysis solely comments on the ratio of post-10 graduates to the total population; it does not take into account the effects of such a rapidly decreased camp population.

### Ban Don Yang

About 10% of Ban Don Yang's population has already departed for resettlement, and includes particularly a significant portion of the health sector. It is difficult to predict how the camp will sustain itself in the future. Rumours that the camp is in danger of closing exist alongside the belief that the governor of Kanchanaburi Province is amenable to allowing refugees to work outside of camp. Selection missions to Ban Don Yang come from countries with smaller quotas, and the future of the camp will be very much dependent on how selective these countries are in terms of resettling the educated versus the non-educated segments of the population.

The projections for Ban Don Yang are difficult to estimate because the population is so small and the range of resettlement countries' intake is so varied in comparison. In Ban Don Yang, out of a total registered population of about 3,500, it is estimated that the camp requires **36** post-10 workers: 13 in administration, 13 in the health sector, 9 in the education sector, and 1 additional. However, according to UNHCR data, only **12** post-10 residents remain in the camp right now. Some members of the 195 unregistered population are working for NGOs at present, which helps to explain how the camp continues to run. Best estimates (which, as noted, are difficult to pinpoint in Ban Don Yang particularly) predict that by the end of 2007, the post-10 population will be under 10 individuals, out of a total population of 3,000 at the close of 2007 and 2,300 at the close of 2008.<sup>82</sup> It seems apparent that Ban Don Yang is deeply reliant on unregistered residents to serve as teachers and other types of camp-based staff; information about the speed of the PAB process in Kanchanaburi Province would be useful in projecting how many unregistered educated workers will remain in the camp in the coming years.

Camp specific analyses reveal the following summary points:

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<sup>81</sup> The following assumptions were made in calculating future projections for Nu Po:

- 90% of those accepted will resettle in 2007 and 5% will resettle in 2008
- Australia and the UK will continue to resettle small numbers (430) of refugees annually from Nu Po.
- The US will resettle 7,000 Nu Po residents in 2008.

<sup>82</sup> The following assumptions were made in calculating future projections for Ban Don Yang:

- 90% of those accepted will resettle in 2007 and 5% will resettle in 2008
- 50% of those already submitted (but not accepted) will leave in 2007, and 50% will leave in 2008
- In 2008, approximately 650 individuals will resettle from Ban Don Yang to the following resettlement countries: Australia, Sweden, Ireland, Finland, Norway, and the Netherlands.

- If the projections above are relatively accurate, and they reflect the loss of skilled workers as well as the post-10 population, the camps that will experience the most difficulties in responding to resettlement in 2007 are **Tham Hin, Ban Nai Soi, and Ban Don Yang**. By the end of 2008, all camps except for Ban Mae Surin and Nu Po will have encountered critical losses of educated and skilled staff.
  - Resettlement countries that accept educated camp residents at a disproportionately higher rate have the potential to inflict a great deal of damage on camp services and administration, even if the total numbers of residents that they accept are very small.
  - It is too early to judge whether group resettlement alleviates some of the problems associated with resettlement. On the one hand, the proportion of skilled and educated residents who will depart at one time is likely to be lower in camps experiencing group resettlement. On the other hand, group resettlement moves much larger shares of the population, and quickly. The sociological effect of such rapid change on a population that has lived in limbo for more than two decades is difficult to predict. The experiences of NGOs, CBOs, CCs, and all camp residents in Mae La, Umpiem Mai, and Nu Po will demonstrate these challenges in the coming eighteen months.
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## Appendix E: Financial Costs of Resettlement

The following table provides a composite of programmatic responses to resettlement and associated approximate costs, as reported by NGO directors and field managers. This list is by no means comprehensive; it neither covers every program nor was every camp consulted in its creation. Furthermore, the presence of some of the programs listed below would obviate the need for others. Some of these programs have already been funded, others seek potential donors. The table is meant primarily as a working tool for NGOs to utilise in budgeting future resettlement costs.

| Sector | Program/Response   | Approx. annual cost in Thai baht | Comments   |
|--------|--|----------------------------------|--|
| Health | Medic training for 30 partially experienced trainees (previous nurses or medic assistants, for example) for one year | 700,000                          | Does not include the salary/administrative costs of an additional expatriate/national doctor, which several medical NGOs asserted would be necessary to conduct an effective training  |
| Health | Medic training for 30 trainees with no experience for two years  | 2,065,000                        | Cost includes trainer and is averaged over two years   |
| Health | Shadowing: Stipends for 30 medic assistants for one year   | 306,000                          |  |
| Health | RCH training for 30 midwives for four months   | 210,000                          | Does not include the salary of a midwife trainer. See next item. Cost based on one training per year.  |
| Health | Midwife trainer  | 1,050,000                        | While the midwife trainer is primarily hired to conduct trainings needed due to the loss of current midwives, her duties extend beyond trainings.  |
| Health | Stipends for 30 midwife assistants for 4 months  | 102,000                          | Cost based on one training per year  |
| Health | Emergency response: salaries for 3 national nurses to fill the gap for 6 months until new medics are ready           | 350,000                          |  |
| Health | Emergency response: salaries for one additional doctor and two additional doctors for long-term contracts            | 2,100,000                        | Necessary only if medic replacement cannot be found, and medical system shifts to reliance on expatriate / national doctors. The costs here were estimated for a camp with a population of 7 to 10 thousand  |
| Health | Increased hospital referrals   | 500,000                          | Very difficult to estimate which increased referral costs are due to resettlement and which are due to other factors. Discussions with various health workers yielded estimates of between 250,000 and 2.5 million baht for supplemental referral costs for a camp |

|              |   |                   |  |
|--------------|---|-------------------|--|
|              |   |                   | population of approximately 10,000.  |
| Health       | Itinerant clinical trainer to provide technical support to all medics worldwide                   | 2,065,000         |  |
| Health       | Community social worker training for 25 trainees for 3 days, 4 times per year                     | 24,000            |  |
| Health       | Shadowing: Stipends for 20 community health workers for 2 months                                  | 20,000            |  |
| Education    | Shadowing: Stipends for 40 teaching assistants for the duration of the school year                | 200,000           | Cost based on providing assistants to one-quarter of teaching population in a camp with a population of approximately 10,000 |
| Education    | Training for 40 pre-teaching assistants for five days (prior to shadowing)                        | 4,000             | Cost based on providing assistants to one-quarter of teaching population in a camp with a population of approximately 10,000 |
| Education    | Salary for NGO counterparts for education programs previously administered by camp-based refugees | 720,000           | Cost based on needs of two camps totalling camp population of approximately 20,000   |
| Education    | Shadowing: Stipends for education supervisors' apprentices for one year                           | 96,000            | Cost based on needs of two camps totalling camp population of approximately 20,000   |
| Education    | Shadowing: Stipends for 70 RTT apprentices for one year   | 840,000           | Cost based on providing apprentices to the majority of RTTs in all seven Karen camps   |
| Education    | Training for 30 nursery school teachers for 3-month training                                      | 250,000           |  |
| Admin        | Capacity building training for 60 CBO participants for one month                                  | 400,000           | Trainings geared toward KWO or KYO, for example  |
| Admin        | Printing costs of KWO handover manual to be distributed to 30 members in each camp                | 9,450             | Cost based on providing manual to all seven Karen camps. Transportation costs to camp not included.                          |
| Admin        | Handover project for 300 KWO staff for 2-day training   | 308,400           | Cost based on all handover costs (training, materials, research) for seven Karen camps                                       |
| <b>Total</b> |   | <b>12,319,850</b> |  |

## Appendix F: List of Stakeholders Interviewed

26 MARCH – 10 MAY 2007

| Date                       | Stakeholder  |
|----------------------------|--|
| Bangkok                    |  |
| 26 March 2007              | <b>Embassy of Finland</b><br>Jussi Koskela, First Secretary, Deputy Head of Mission  |
|                            | <b>UNHCR donor meeting</b> with NGOs<br>(IRC, COERR, ZOA, USCRI, SVA)  |
| 27 March                   | <b>IOM Regional Office for Southeast Asia</b><br>Hans Becker, Regional Programme Coordinator, Resettlement and Voluntary Return  |
| 28 March                   | <b>Embassy of Sweden</b><br>Torsten Torstensson, Counsellor, Migration Affairs   |
|                            | <b>Royal Netherlands Embassy</b><br>Peter Keulers, Counsellor  |
| 29 March                   | <b>Australian Embassy</b><br>Julia Niblett, Counsellor (Immigration), Regional Director  |
|                            | <b>Embassy of the USA</b><br>Michael Honnold, Refugee Coordinator for SE Asia  |
|                            | <b>UNHCR, Regional Office for Thailand, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam</b><br>Giuseppe de Vincentes<br>Jeffrey Savage, Resettlement Officer<br>Cathy Sunae Shin, Associate Resettlement Officer  |
| 2 April                    | <b>Thai Ministry of the Interior</b><br>Khun Tassana Vichaithanapat, Assistant Director, The Operation Center for Displaced Persons  |
| Kanchanaburi               |  |
| 3 April                    | <b>IRC</b><br>Dr. Abdul Omar, Medical Officer<br>Giorgio Faedo, IRC officer<br>Nyein Nyein Ei, CHW coordinator   |
| Ratchaburi (Tham Hin camp) |  |
| 3 April                    | <b>IRC town staff meeting</b><br>Lab Supervisor, Medical Referral Officer, Community Health Officer, Medical Officers, Driver, Office Assistant, Administration/Finance, Pharmacy, Logistics, Environmental Health officer                       |
|                            | <b>IOM (Kachanaburi)</b><br>General staff:<br>Mr. Mongkol Srilaanthong, Ms. Kannika Burphrom, Mr. Bordee<br>IOM Cultural Orientation team:<br>Mingkhwan Sinthuwong, Cultural Orientation Trainer<br>Pojaman Som-in, Cultural Orientation Trainer |
|                            | <b>IRC</b><br>Ban Jong Sudhiprapha, Lab Supervisor   |
|                            | Tiladi, Tham Hin <i>Palat</i>  |
| 4 April                    | <b>IRC</b><br>Aneley Getahun, Medical Officer  |
|                            | <b>COERR</b><br>Sayan Thamyoo, Field Manager,  |
|                            | Household visits to:   |

| Date  | Stakeholder  |
|---|--|
|   | Camp merchant<br>Individuals who are uncertain about resettlement or do not want to resettle<br><b>ZOA</b><br>Selection of camp-based staff<br>Zone 3 leader, Zone 1 leader<br><b>Shanti Volunteer Association (SVA)</b><br>Library staff  |
| 5 April   | <b>UNHCR</b><br>Naeem J. Durrani, Head of Field Office, Kanchanaburi<br><b>Tham Hin Refugee Committee</b><br>Chairperson, Vice Chairperson, Security, Camp Affairs, Judicial, Social Affairs, Health, Education<br><b>OPE, IRC</b><br>Jon Ferris-Childers, Field Team Leader   |
| Mae Hong Son (Karenni Site 1 and Site 2 camps)        |  |
| 9 April   | <b>COERR</b><br>Thiphawan Kamonthammachot,   |
| Site 2 Ban Mae Surin                                  |  |
| 10 April  | <b>Camp Committee meeting</b><br>Pya Reh, Chair<br>Ga Nes Too, Human Resources   |
| Site 1 Ban Nai Soi                                    |  |
| 11 April  | <b>IRC</b><br>Naomi Nyitambe, RCH trainer<br>Dave Sharma, Health Coordinator<br><b>KnHD</b><br>Luka  |
| 12 April  | <b>KnDD</b><br>David Soh Wa, former head<br><b>Camp Committee meeting</b><br>Poh Ray, Chairman<br>Pen The Loo, Vice Chairman<br><b>CBO meeting</b><br>Poh Bya, KnRC Chairman<br>Za Ni Set, KnDD Member<br>Zone leaders from seven zones<br><b>Weave</b><br>Ryan Lynch, Vocational and Alternative Livelihood Officer |
| 13 April  | <b>CCSDPT health subcommittee</b><br>Liviu Vedrasco, chair, telephone conversation   |
| 15 April  | <b>JRS</b><br>Kelle Marin Rivers, Karenni Education Project Coordinator  |
| 16 April  | <b>IRC</b><br>K'nyaw Htoo, RCH Supervisor<br><b>UNHCR</b><br>Benjamas Kantanan, Field Assistant  |
| Mae Sariang (and Ma Ra Ma Luang and Mae La Oon camps) |  |
| Tues 17 April   | <b>TBBC</b><br>David Curmi, Field Coordinator<br><b>UNHCR</b><br>Michael Booker, Field Officer<br>Elizabeth Brezovich, Field Officer   |

| Date                          | Stakeholder  |
|-------------------------------|--|
|                               | <b>COERR</b><br>Benjawan Maliwan, Field Manager  |
| Ma Ra Ma Luang camp           |  |
| Wed 18 April                  | <b>Camp Committee and CBOs meeting</b><br>Chairperson, Deputy Chairperson, Camp Secretary, Education Coordinator, Health Coordinator, Social Affairs, Auditor, Section Leaders 1-7 (7A, 7B), Green Tree, Section Leader (new arrivals section)<br>KYO, Handicap International, KYWLS, COERR, KWO Chair and members<br><b>Camp Committee Social Affairs</b><br>Ywa Baw, Coordinator (also Education Committee member for No. 1 High School, Chairperson No. 4 Primary School)<br><b>Camp Committee Health</b><br>Wil Man, Coordinator, Chairperson of Special Education<br><b>Karen Young Women's Leadership School (KYWLS)</b><br>Abi Shag David |
| 19 April                      | <b>Karen Education Project</b><br>Htay Win   |
|                               | <b>Planned Parenthood Association of Thailand (PPAT) meeting</b><br>Office Supervisor, Assistant nurses (4), Women's Empowerment Trainer, PPAT Mae Sariang Field Office Coordinator<br><b>Vocational Training program, ZOA</b><br>Eh Doh Moe, Coordinator<br><b>SVA</b><br>Jiraporn Rawiroung, Project Manager/Mae Sariang Field Coordinator<br><b>Handicap International</b><br>Saw Rwa Gyi, Workshop Supervisor<br>Sa Si Paw, Logistics<br><b>KYO</b><br>Naw Hsa Gay, Coordinator<br><b>TBBC</b><br>Field Assistant, Arthorn Srikeeratikarn  |
| Mae La Oon camp               |  |
| 18 April                      | <b>ZOA</b><br>Vocational training program staff<br><b>PPAT</b><br>Staff  |
| 19 April                      | <b>Camp committee and CBO meeting</b><br>CC Vice Chair, Social and Welfare, Health, Supply Manager, KWO, KSNG, KYO, COERR, Child Protection Advocate, Head Teacher of Mission School, Section leaders<br><b>ZOA</b><br>Saw Henry, Education Coordinator<br>Informal discussion with group of people who are uncertain about resettlement   |
| Mae Sariang town and district |  |
| 20 April                      | <i>Palat</i> for Ma Ra Ma Luang<br><i>Palat</i> for Mae La Oon<br>Sob-Moei Subdistrict, Mae Sariang District, Mae Hong Son Province<br><b>Malteser International (MI)</b><br>Michaela Michel-Schuldt, Midwife<br>Wiphan Kaloi, Reproductive Health Coordinator<br>Wilaphan, Water and Sanitation Coordinator<br><b>KWO and Karen CBOs half-day roundtable</b><br>KWO<br>Naw Zipporah Sein, KWO Secretary<br>Naw Htoo Paw   |

| Date                                     | Stakeholder   |
|--|---|
|  | Jane Abbey (AVI/KWO)<br>CBOs:<br>Kaw Lah Films<br>DARE<br>Committee for Internally Displaced Karen People (CIDKP)<br>Karen Office for Relief and Development (KORD)<br>Karen Northern Further Education Programme (KNFEP) |
| Mae Sot (Mae La, Umpiem and Nu Po camps) |   |
| 23 April                                 | <b>Protection Working Group (PWG) meeting</b><br>Hosted by TBBC<br>(TBBC, MSF, AMI, UNHCR, ARC, IRC, RTP, WE/C)   |
|  | <b>AMI</b><br>Frederic Pascal, Mae La Project Manager   |
|  | <b>TBBC</b><br>Chris Clifford   |
| 24 April                                 | <b>ZOA</b><br>Marc van der Stouve, Program Advisor  |
|  | <b>COERR</b><br>Chumpol Maniratanavongsiri  |
|  | <b>WE/C</b><br>Fred Ligon, Director   |
|  | <b>UNHCR</b><br>Elizabeth Kirton, Head of Field Office<br>Cathrine Elisabeth Fari, Resettlement Officer<br>Robert Kai Lim Ho, Associate Protection Officer<br>Anya Hodayverenova, Associate Field Officer                 |
|  | <b>TBBC</b><br>Miles Jury, Community Liaison Officer  |
|  | <b>Right to Play</b><br>Chris Morris, Field Coordinator   |
| Umpiem Camp                              |   |
| 25 April                                 | <b>AMI</b><br>Saw Dah, Head Medic of AMI Hospital   |
|  | <b>Camp Committee</b><br>Saw Wah Htee, Camp Leader  |
|  | <b>ARC</b><br>Paw Shee, Reproductive and Child Healthcare program, Supervisor   |
| 26 April                                 | <b>Camp Committee</b><br>Naw Neh Da and Sa Paw, Health Coordinators 1 and 2   |
|  | <b>Camp Committee</b><br>Mu Ki Thu, Education Coordinator   |
|  | <b>KYO</b><br>Saw Hsar Ner Htoo and Saw Poe Dah, Executive Committee  |
|  | Slipholders Section 16, household visit   |
| Mae La camp                              |   |
| 25 April                                 | <b>Camp Committee</b><br>Thra Htun Htun, Joint Secretary<br>Tha Ker, Vice Chair,<br>Members of Health, Education, Camp Affairs, Justice Committee, Security Committee; KWO, Section Leaders, Kodown and Supply            |
|  | Dr. Simon, Christian leader   |
|  | <b>Care Villa / KHWA</b><br>Mordecai, caretaker<br>Several residents of care villa  |

| Date       | Stakeholder  |
|------------|--|
|            | Muslim leaders<br><b>KWO</b><br>Leh Leh Win, outgoing Chairwoman   |
| 26 April   | <b>AMI</b><br>Julie, Nurse Coordinator<br>Buddhist leaders<br><b>ABSDF</b><br>Confidential interview<br><b>KWO</b><br>Eh Say, incoming Chairwoman<br><b>KNU</b><br>Former soldier, confidential interview<br><b>KWO</b><br>Caretaker and residents of a KWO boarding house<br><b>KEWU</b><br>Sah Pla Mae, member<br><b>KYO</b><br>Honest, member |
| Mae Sot    |  |
| 26 April   | <b>Handicap International</b><br>Magali Ortiz, Mine Risk Education Manager   |
| 27 April   | <b>ZOA</b><br>Loytee Taluang, Program Manager<br><b>KRC</b><br>Saw George<br><b>SVA</b><br>Aki Nakahara, Project Manager<br><b>IRC</b><br>Legal Assistance Centres program   |
|            | <b>Mae Tao clinic</b><br>Ethwa and Lisa<br><b>Weave</b><br>Assistant staff member<br><b>TOPS</b> (Taiwan Overseas Peace Service)<br>Shu-Sheng Lai (Sam)<br><b>ADRA (Adventist Development and Relief Agency), Eden Valley Academy</b><br>Sakda, school supervisor  |
| Umphang    |  |
| 30 April   | <b>TBBC</b><br>Sakha Chuttiwatarnsuk (Richard), Field Assistant<br><b>ARC International</b><br>Charles (Chuck) Schumacher, Field Coordinator<br>Christina Bradlee, SGBV Coordinator  |
| Nu Po Camp |  |
| 1 May      | <b>KWO</b><br>Nay Lar, Chairperson<br>Lu Lu, Deputy Chair<br>Dah Ser, Secretary<br><b>Camp Committee</b><br>Saw Samson, Chairperson<br><b>Karen Students Network Group (KSNG)</b><br>Thoo Lay Doh Soe  |
| Umphang    |  |
| 2 May      | <b>AMI</b><br>Marie le Duc, Umpiem/NuPo Project Manager  |

| Date                              | Stakeholder   |
|-----------------------------------|---|
|                                   | <b>Right to Play</b><br>Amy Walsh, Nu Po manager<br>Kat Powell, Umpiem manager  |
| Nu Po Camp                        |   |
| 3 May                             | <b>Camp Committee</b><br>Naw Doreena, Health Coordinator and SGBV focal point<br>Post-10 student, Say Ter<br>Muslim section (section 11), Section leader and his wife (plus household visit)<br><b>ARC Community Health Education (CHE) program</b><br>Isabella Tun, Supervisor<br>Saw Wilbert, Assistant Supervisor<br>ARC CHE Interpreter<br><b>UNHCR (registration office)</b><br>Robert Kai Lim Ho, Associate Protection Officer<br><b>AMI</b><br>Doctor (Epidemiologist), IPD/OPD Clinic |
| Sangklaburi and Ban Don Yang camp |   |
| 1 May                             | <b>TBBC</b><br>Philip Galvin, Field Coordinator, Sangklaburi  |
| Ban Don Yang camp                 |   |
| 2 May                             | <b>ARC</b><br>Chulai, RCH coordinator<br>Shelly, slipholder representative<br><b>Camp Committee meeting</b><br>Chair, Vice-Chair, Secretary, Health, Security, Education, Justice, Supply Manager, KWO<br><b>ARC</b><br>Yuriko Jinno, RCH, CHE coordinator<br><b>TBBC</b><br>Andrea Menefee, Programme Specialist, Nutrition  |
| 3 May                             | Informal interview, unregistered camp resident<br><b>Handicap International</b><br>San Lwin, Coordinator<br><b>ZOA</b><br>Pupi, REK (resident educator, Karen Education project)<br><b>COERR</b><br>Som Kiat, Ratchaburi Field Officer<br><b>KED</b><br>Ban Don Yang Representative<br><b>ARC</b><br>Saiful Qayyum, Clinical Coordinator  |
| 7 May                             | <b>IRC</b><br>Jennifer Olson, field coordinator, Mae Hong Son, telephone interview<br><b>KED</b><br>Thra La Say, Chairman, telephone interview  |
| Bangkok                           |   |
| 8 May                             | Presentation to and feedback from CCSDPT Directors  |
| 9 May                             | Presentation to open CCSDPT open monthly meeting<br>Feedback from CCSDPT Education Sub-committee<br>Feedback from CCSDPT Health Sub-committee   |
| 10 May                            | <b>SMRU</b><br>Dr. Rose McGready, phone interview   |